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Executive Summary 
Despite a well developed theoretical foundation, empirical work on the return to 
human capital, for example the effect of a year of schooling on the wage of an individual, has 
been the focus of considerable debate in the economics literature.  A dominant feature of the 
literature that estimates human capital earnings relationships, is the implicit assumption that 
human capital is exogenous, and this has been the focus of recent research efforts.   
 Simple multivariate analyses of large UK datasets that contain information on 
earnings, education and characteristics, suggests a return to a year of schooling of between 
7% and 9%. The basic specification assumes that (log) earnings are linear in education, so 
that each year of education adds the same percentage amount to earnings irrespective of the 
particular year of education.  This may seem implausible but it has been difficult to find 
examples in the literature that conclusively prove that linearity is not a reasonable empirical 
approximation.   There is limited evidence that some years of schooling carry ‘sheepskin’ 
effects – leaving school the year immediately following a credential awarding year for 
example may generate a lower return for that year generating a dip in the education/earning 
profile. 
 The returns to education seem to differ across the wage distribution.  Our evidence 
points to returns being higher for those in the top deciles of the income distribution compared 
to those in the bottom deciles.  Moreover this inequality may have increased in recent years. 
This finding has important implications for both education and tax and social security policy: 
the low return to investing in low ability individuals and the high return to investing in high 
ability individuals implies that educational investment should be skewed towards the high 
ability individuals. The resulting inequality may then be dealt with through redistributive tax 
and social security policy. Against this should be set the inefficiency associated with work 
disincentives induced by having a strongly redistributive tax and social security 
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 Given the increase in the supply of educated workers in most OECD countries there is 
a concern that the skills workers bring to their job will exceed the skills required for the job: 
that is, the market for skilled workers does not clear. This will manifest itself in a lower 
return to schooling for the years of schooling in excess of those required for the employer.   
One of the main problems with this literature is the often poor definition of overeducation in 
available datasets, typically based on subjective measures given by the individual respondent.   
Where a more comprehensive definition is used based on job satisfaction the apparent 
negative effect of overeducation is eliminated when ability controls are included, but when 
overeducation appears to be genuine the penalty may be much larger than was first thought. 
This has important implications for the variance in the quality of graduates produced 
by the higher education system. Firstly, a degree is not sufficient to ensure a graduate job – 
other complementary skills are expected by graduate employers. Secondly, since genuine 
overeducation can emerge it is clear that the labour market does not adjust fast enough. So a 
degree of manpower planning is required to ensure that particular types of graduate are not 
produced excessively. 
 It is possible that the return to education actually reflects the underlying ability that 
education signals – in other words education is a signal of inherent productivity of the 
individual rather than a means to enhance the productivity.   Estimates presented here of the 
signalling component of the returns suggest that the effect is quite small.   
 Ideally the way we would wish to measure the return to schooling would be to 
compare the earnings of an individual with two different levels of schooling, but in practice 
only one level of education is observed for a particular individual.  The literature has recently 
attempted to deal with this problem by finding ‘experiments’ in the economy that randomly 
assign groups of individuals to different levels of schooling.   We can, for example, examine 
the wages of people who left school at 16 when the minimum school leaving age was raised 
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to 16 compared to those that left school at 15 before the change in the minimum age 
legislation.   This gives us a measure of the return to schooling for those that would not have 
chosen an extra year of schooling.  The return to schooling from studies that use this 
methodology seem to be larger than those obtained using simple regression methods.   
This simple idea can be embedded in a more sophisticated modelling procedure that 
can be used to deal with the endogeneity problem.   The effect of this change in estimation 
procedure can be considerable.  Average returns to schooling from simple regression methods 
are around 6% internationally but over 9% from these alternative methods. The UK appears 
to be at the higher end of the international range so,  for the UK, the comparison is between 7 
and 9% from simple methods to a range of 11% to 15% from the more sophisticated methods 
that attempt to control for the endogeneity of human capital.   A concern about this 
methodology is that the higher returns found may reflect the return for the particular 
subgroup affected by the policy intervention.   Thus, for example, changes in compulsory 
schooling laws may affect those individuals who place the least value on education – and as 
such estimates of the return to schooling based on these changes may be estimating the 
returns for that group.   
 Evidence on the net benefits to the economy, taking account of the increased 
earnings and the cost of providing education is limited in the UK, mainly to HE. The 
available evidence suggests that those net benefits are positive, but vary by degree subject 
with the highest return captured by medicine, non-biological sciences, social sciences and 
computing.  Given the high return to education to the individual, unless there are benefits to 
society (social returns) over and above the private returns the argument for the taxpayer to 
provide extensive subsidies for education seem weak. Such benefits might include those with 
more education raising the productivity of those working along side them, and social 
cohesion benefits. 
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Direct cross-country macroeconomic evidence that links growth to education in 
confounded by the unclear nature of the causal relationship between average schooling levels 
and measures such as GNP growth.   The microeconomic studies that are available confirm 
this and show how many of the important findings linking education to growth are based on 
restrictive functional form assumptions.   What is needed to solve the issue of this wider 
impact of education on society is a parallel to the experimental approach adopted in the 
estimation of private returns. This suggests that within-country rather than between-country 
analysis may be the route to quantifying the externality from education.    
 The returns to education may be non-pecuniary.  The link between job satisfaction 
and education is not heavily researched.   Evidence presented here based on the BHPS data 
suggest that contrary to prior assumptions education may be negatively associated with job 
satisfaction due to the high aspirations that well-educated individuals may have for their 
careers. However this issue requires more attention than it has been given in the past. 
 Finally we present evidence on the effect of family background on education 
decisions.   By exploiting the correlation between education and schooling-contingent 
parental income (child support from absent parents and Child Benefit) we find a large and 
statistically significant effect of income transfers to parents that increases the probability of 
staying in education past the age of 16 when a relatively parsimonious model is used.  While 
the result is suggestive, we find that it becomes weaker when additional control variables are 
included in the model and a full evaluation of policies that provide schooling-contingent 
income would be required to provide the evidence on which to base policy. 
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Part A:  Estimating the Private Return to Education 
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1. Introduction 
This report is concerned with the returns to human capital. In particular we focus on 
education as a private decision to invest in “human capital” and we explore the “internal” rate 
of return to that private investment. Evidence that the private returns are disproportionately 
high relative to other investments with similar degrees of risk would suggest that there is 
some “market failure” that prevents individuals implementing their privately optimal plans. 
This may then provide a role for intervention. While the literature is replete with studies that 
estimate this rate of return using regression methods, where the estimated return is obtained 
as the coefficient on a years of education variable in a log wage equation that contains 
controls for work experience and other individual characteristics, the issue is surrounded with 
difficulties.  
Here we explore conventional estimates from a variety of datasets and pay particular 
attention to a number of the most important difficulties. For example, it is unclear that one 
can give a productivity interpretation to the coefficient if education is a signal of pre-existing 
ability. Indeed, the coefficient on years of education may not reflect the effect of education 
on productivity if it is correlated with unobserved characteristics that are also correlated with 
wages. In this case, the education coefficient would reflect both the effect of education on 
productivity and the effect of the unobserved variable that is correlated with education. For 
example, “ability” (to progress in education) may be unobservable and may be correlated 
with the ability to make money in the labour market. Similarly, a high private “discount rate” 
would imply that the individual’s privately optimal level of education would be low and, yet, 
such an unobservable characteristic conceivably may itself be positively correlated with high 
wages.  Measurement error in the education variable can also lead to bias to the estimated 
coefficient – in this case, conventional estimation methods can suggest that the return to 
education is lower that is actually the case. 
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The signalling role of education may manifest itself in an effect of credentials on 
wages: there may be a pay premium associated with years of education that result in 
credentials being earned. This ought to manifest itself in a nonlinear relationship between 
(log) wages and years of education, and in there being a distribution of leaving education that 
is skewed away from years without credentials towards those years with credentials. 
There may be other factors that affect the policy and economic interpretation of the 
statistical estimates: there may be “over”education where, because of labour market rigidities 
of some form, relative wages for different types of workers does not clear the markets for 
those types. For example, if the wage for highly educated workers is too high to clear the 
market, then this type of worker may take a job that requires only a lower level of skill and 
commands a lower wage. This overeducation would manifest itself as a lower estimate of the 
average return to education and ought to result, in the long run, in a decline in education 
levels. That is, if there is some factor that prevents relative wages to adjust then quantities 
will adjust instead. A related issue is the extent to which there is heterogeneity in the returns 
to education: returns may differ across individuals because they differ in the efficiency with 
which they can exploit education to raise their productivity. There may be individual-specific 
skills, for example social or analytical skills, which are complementary to formal education 
so that individuals with a large endowment of such skills reap a higher return to their 
investment in education than those with a low endowment. Thus, for example, some college 
graduates may not be well endowed with these complementary skills and may appear to be 
overeducated: in fact, they are simply less productive than other graduates in graduate jobs. 
A topic that is much neglected in the existing literature is the non-pecuniary returns to 
education: education may yield both higher wages and change the non-pecuniary aspects of 
jobs. It is unclear, a priori, in which direction this would work: education may change 
preferences between the pecuniary and non-pecuniary elements of remuneration in either 
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direction. However, education affects job satisfaction both directly and indirectly through its 
affect on wages, and here we investigate the extent to which education affects job satisfaction 
directly by controlling for wages. 
Finally, we consider the “social” return to education, by which we mean the return to 
society over and above the private returns to individuals. Part of the private gross returns is 
given over to the government through taxation (and through reduced welfare entitlements). In 
addition to this tax wedge,  the private return is indicative of whether the appropriate level of 
education is being provided, while the social return is suggestive of how that level should be 
funded. If there are significant social returns over and above the private returns there is then a 
case for providing a public subsidy to align private incentives with social optimality. This 
literature is less well developed than the research on private returns but features some of the 
same difficulties – in particular, measurement error in the education variable and simultaneity 
between (aggregate) education and GNP (aggregate income) – that cloud the interpretation of 
the estimated education coefficient. 
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2. The Human Capital Framework and the Returns to Schooling 
2.1 A Brief Consideration of the Theory 
The analysis of the demand for education has been driven by the concept of human 
capital approach and has been pioneered by Gary Becker, Jacob Mincer and Theodore 
Schultz. In human capital theory education is an investment of current resources (the 
opportunity cost of the time involved as well as any direct costs) in exchange for future 
returns.   The benchmark model for the development of empirical estimation of the returns to 
education is the key relationship derived by Mincer (1974).  The typical human capital theory 
(Becker (1964)) assumes that education, s, is chosen to maximise the expected present value 
of the stream of future incomes, up to retirement at date T, net of the costs of education, cs. 
So, at the optimum s, the PV of the sth year of schooling just equals the costs of the sth year of 
education, so equilibrium is characterised by: ( ) ss
sT
t
t
s
ss cw
r
ww +=+
−
−
−
=
−∑ 1
1
1
1
 where rs is called the 
internal rate of return (we are assuming that s is infinitely divisible, for simplicity, so “year” 
should not be interpreted literally). Optimal investment decision making would imply that 
one would invest in the sth year of schooling if rs>i, the market rate of interest. If T is large 
then the right hand side of the equilibrium expression can be approximated so that the 
equilibrium condition becomes ss
s
ss cw
r
ww +=− −− 11 . Then, if cs is sufficiently small, we can 
rearrange this expression to give 11 loglog −− −≈−≈ ss
s
ss
s www
wwr  (where ≈  means 
approximately equal to). This says that the return to the sth year of schooling is approximately 
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the difference in log wages between leaving at s and at s-1. Thus, one could estimate the 
returns to s by seeing how log wages varies with s1.  
Thus, the empirical approximation of the human capital theoretical framework is the 
familiar functional form of the earnings equation , where 
yi is an earnings measure for an individual i such as earnings per hour or week, Si represents a 
measure of their schooling, xi is an experience measure (typically age-age left schooling), Xi 
is a set of other variables assumed to affect earnings, and ui is a disturbance term representing 
other forces which may not be explicitly measured, assumed independent of Xi and si.  Note 
that experience is included as a quadratic term to capture the concavity of the earnings 
profile.  Mincer’s derivation of the empirical model implies that, under the assumptions made 
(particularly no tuition costs),  r can be considered the private financial return to schooling as 
well as being the proportionate effect on wages of an increment to S. 
2
  log   +  + +  + i i i iw rS x xβ δ γ= iX iu
 
 The availability of microdata and the ease of estimation has resulted in many studies, 
which essentially estimate the simple Mincer specification. In the original study Mincer 
(1974) used 1960 US Census data and used an experience measure known as potential 
1 In practice a number of further assumptions are typically made to give a specification that can be estimated 
simply. Mincer (1974) assumed that rs is a constant -  so ttt YhYr Δ= , where Yt is potential earnings and ht is the 
proportion of period t spent acquiring human capital. During full-time education ht=1 so . For post-
school years, Mincer assumes that ht declines linearly with experience, i.e 
rs
s eYY 0=
( )  t0 0th h h T= − . So for x years of 
post-school work experience can be written as . Note that the rules of integration imply that ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫x tsx dthrYY 0exp
20
0
0 2
1 x
T
hxhdth
x
t −=∫ , and assuming that the Y0 can be captured as a linear function of characteristics X we also 
have . Thus, we can write the expression for income after x years of experience and s years 
of schooling as 
rsrs
s eeYY βX== 0
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= 0eYY rsx 200 2exp xT
hxhr . Thus, taking logs, 2000 2
log x
T
rhxrhrsYYx ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−++=log  and, since 
actual earnings is ( ) xxx Yh−w = 1 , we finally arrive at the conventional Mincer specification: 
( ) ( )20 0log 2 log 1x xh−w rs rhβ= + +X x rh T x− + . 
 13
experience (i.e. current age minus age left full time schooling) and found that the returns to 
schooling were 10% with returns to experience of around 8%.  Layard and Psacharopolous 
(1979) used the GB GHS 1972 data and found returns to schooling of a similar level, around 
10% and see Willis (1986) and Psacharopolous (1994) for many more examples of this 
simple specification.  In a few studies it has been applied to panel data.   For example Lillard 
and Rosen (1978) attempt to estimate the extent to which the differentials in wages across 
individuals observed in a cross-section of data persist over time using the US Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) for 1967-73. They estimate a standard earnings functions and show 
that the schooling and experience terms explain about 35% of the variance in log earnings 
across individuals, and about 44% of the average cross time of the log earnings of 
individuals. This suggests that most of the cross-section variance in earnings across 
individuals persists over time.  
The Mincerian specification has been extended to address questions such as 
discrimination, effectiveness of training programmes, school quality, return to language 
skills, and even the return to "beauty" (see Hammermesh and Biddle (1994, 1998)).   
 Clearly in this empirical implementation the schooling measure is treated as 
exogenous, although education is clearly an endogenous choice variable in the underlying 
human capital theory.  Moreover, in the Mincer specification the disturbance term captures 
unobservable individual effects and these individual factors may also influence the schooling 
decision, and induce a correlation between schooling and the error term in the earnings 
function.  A common example is unobserved ability. This problem has been the 
preoccupation of the literature since the earliest contributions - if schooling is endogenous 
then estimation by least squares methods will yield biased estimates of the return to 
schooling.   
 14
There have been a number of approaches to deal with this problem.  Firstly, measures 
of ability have been incorporated to proxy for unobserved effects. The inclusion of direct 
measures of ability should reduce the estimated education coefficient if it acts as a proxy for 
ability, so that the coefficient on education then captures the effect of education alone since 
ability is controlled for.  Secondly one might exploit within-twins or within-siblings 
differences in wages  and education if one were prepared to accept the assumption that 
unobserved effects are additive and common within twins so that they can be differenced out 
by regressing the wage difference within twins against the education difference.  This 
approach is a modification of a more general fixed effect framework using individual panel 
data, where the unobserved individual effect is considered time-invariant.  A final approach 
deals directly with the schooling/earnings relationship in a two-equation system by exploiting 
instrumental variables that affect S but not w.  We return to these in detail later in this report. 
2.2 Optimal Schooling Choices 
 It is useful at this point to consider the implications of endogenous schooling.  As 
suggested above, the human capital framework, on which the original Mincer work was 
based, schooling is an optimizing investment decision based on future earnings and current 
costs: that is, on the (discounted) difference in earnings from undertaking and not undertaking 
education and the total cost of education including foregone earnings.  Investment in 
education continues until the difference between the marginal cost and marginal return to 
education is zero. 
 A number of implications stem from considering schooling as an investment decision.  
Firstly, the internal rate of return (IRR, or r in this review) is the discount rate that equates the 
present value of benefits to the present value of costs.  More specifically if the IRR is greater 
than market rate of interest more education is a worthwhile investment for the individual.  In 
making an investment decision an individual who places more (less) value on current income 
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than future income streams will have a higher (lower) value for the discount rates so 
individuals with high discount rates (high ri) are therefore less likely to undertake education2.  
Secondly, direct education costs (cs) lower the net benefits of schooling.  Finally, if the 
probability of being in employment is higher if more schooling is undertaken then an increase 
in unemployment benefit would erode the reward from undertaking education.   However, 
should the earnings gap between educated and non-educated individuals widen or if the 
income received while in schooling should rise (say, through a tuition subsidy or maintenance 
grant) the net effect on the incentive to invest in schooling should be positive. 
 A useful extension to the theory is to consider the role of the individual’s ability on 
the schooling decision, whilst preserving the basic idea of schooling being an investment. 
Griliches (1977) introduces ability (A) explicitly into the derivation of the log-linear earnings 
function.  In the basic model the IRR of schooling is partly determined by foregone income 
(less any subsidy such as parental contributions) and any educational costs. Introducing 
ability differences has two effects on this basic calculus. The more able individuals may be 
able to ‘convert’ schooling into human capital more efficiently3 4 than the less able, and this 
raises the IRR for the more able. One might think of this as inherent ability and education 
being complementary factors in producing human capital so that, for a given increment to 
schooling, a larger endowment of ability generates more human capital. On the other hand, 
the more able may have higher opportunity costs since they may have been able to earn more 
 
2  Thus the model implies that early schooling has a greater return than schooling later in life since there are 
fewer periods left to recoup the costs. 
3  Greater levels of ability may also increase the marginal cost of schooling by the positive effect of ability on 
earnings (and therefore foregone earnings while in education).  The net effect can therefore be ambiguous.    
4  In the Griliches model there is a subtle extension often overlooked but highlighted by Card (1994).  There can 
exist a negative relationship between optimal schooling and the disturbance term in the earnings function by 
assuming the presence of a second unmeasured factor (call this energy or motivation) that increases income and 
by association foregone earnings while at school, but is otherwise unrelated to schooling costs.   
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in the labour market, if ability to progress in school is positively correlated with the ability to 
earn, and this reduces the IRR 
 The empirical implications of this extension to the basic theory are most clearly 
outlined in Card (2000), which again embodies the usual idea that the optimal schooling level 
equates the marginal rate of return to additional schooling with the marginal cost of this 
additional schooling. However, Card (2000) allows the optimal schooling to vary across 
individuals for a further reason: not only can have different returns to schooling arise from 
variation in ability, so that those of higher ability ‘gain’ more from additional schooling, but 
individuals may also have different marginal rates of substitution between current and future 
earnings. That is, there may be some variation in the discount rate across individuals.  This 
variation in discount rates may come for example from variation in access to funds or taste 
for schooling.   
If ability levels are similar across individuals then the effects are relatively 
unambiguous - lower discount rate individuals choose more schooling.   However, one might 
expect a negative correlation between these two elements: high-ability parents, who would 
typically be wealthier, will tend to be able to offer more to their children in terms of resources 
for education.  Moreover highly educated parents will have stronger tastes for schooling (or 
lower discount rates) and their children may “inherit” some of this.  Indeed, if ability is partly 
inherited then children with higher ability may be more likely than the average child to have 
lower discount rates.  The reverse is true for children of lower ability parents.   Empirically 
this modification allows for an expression for the potential bias in the least squares estimate 
of the return to schooling to be derived.  This bias will be determined by the variance in 
ability relative to the variance in discount rates as well as the covariance between them. This 
“endogeneity” bias arises because people with higher marginal returns to education choose 
higher levels of schooling.  If there is no discount rate variance then the endogeneity will 
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arise solely from the correlation between ability and education and since this is likely to be 
positive the bias in OLS estimates will be upwards (if ability increases wages later in life 
more than it increases wages early in life). If there is no ability variance, then the endogeneity 
arises solely from the (negative) correlation between discount rates and OLS will be biased 
downwards if discount rates and wages are positively correlated (for example, if ambitious 
people earn higher wages and are more impatient). Thus, the direction of bias in OLS 
estimates of the returns to education is unclear and is, ultimately, an empirical question. 
2.3  Returns to Schooling – Stylised Facts and Potential Issues 
The Family Expenditure Survey (FES) is a random sample of approximately 7000 
households each year and years of education is available for every year from 1978.  Figure 
2.1 shows the relationship between full-time school leaving age and the log real hourly wage 
(there are few observations above age 24 and below 15 or in the 19/20 "dip") for men and 
women aged 21-59 in Great Britain. Note that the relationship for men is distinctly flatter 
than for women. The Family Resources Survey (FRS) data is a random sample of 
approximately 25,000 households conducted every year from 1993/4 and Figure 2.2 shows 
the same relationship between wages and education in that data.  Of course this work, by 
simply plotting the average wage for each schooling group, neglects the effect of any other 
control variables. In particular, one could only deduce the returns to education from this 
figure if it were true that other variables that affect wages were uncorrelated with schooling. 
This is unlikely to be true – in particular, older people in the sample are likely to have lower 
levels of education but more work experience. Figure 2.3 shows the average relationship 
between log wages and age for individuals with different levels of schooling (for GB men 
aged 21-59) in FES while Figure 2.4 shows the average relationships for men and women in 
FRS pooled for the three years 93/4-96/7. Note the characteristically flatter shape for those 
with lower levels of education and for women.    
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Figure 2.1 Education and Wages 
GB Employed Men and Women aged 15-59 in FES 1978-1999. 
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Figure 2.2 Education and Wages 
GB Employed Men and Women aged 15-59 in FRS 1993/4-1996/7. 
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Figure 2.3 Age and Wages by Age Left School 
GB Employed Men and Women aged 15-59 in FES 1978-1999. 
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Figure 2.4 Age and Wages 
GB Employed Men and Women aged 15-59 in FRS 1993/4-1996/7. 
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Again, one needs to be cautious about using these figures to deduce the returns to work 
experience because the older more experienced workers will typically have lower education 
levels. 
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2.4 Regression Analysis 
Because wages are determined by a variety of variables, some of which will be 
correlated with each other, we need to use multivariate regression methods to derive 
meaningful estimates of the effect on wages of any one variable – in particular, of education. 
We present results from a wide variety of datasets – both for within the UK and across 
countries. Thus, Table 2.1 presents estimates of the rate of return to education based on 
multivariate (OLS, or Ordinary Least Squares) analysis from the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP) data that are drawn together from national surveys that are designed to be 
consistent with each other. The British data in ISSP is taken from the British Social Attitudes 
Surveys.  In Table 2.1 we apply exactly the same estimation methods to data that has been 
constructed to be closely comparable across countries.  The results (standard errors are in 
italics) show that GB (and indeed Northern Ireland) has large returns relative to international 
standards. 
These estimates have the advantage that they are all derived from common data that 
makes them exactly comparable. But they do so at the cost of simplicity. In particular, the 
estimated models contain controls only for age and union status – including further control 
variables would be likely to reduce the estimated schooling coefficient. Thus, it might be also 
interesting to consider cross-country rates of return derived from national surveys rather than 
a single consistent source such as like ISSP.  Recent results from a pan-EU network of 
researchers (entitled Public Fund and Private Returns to Education (known as PURE)) do 
precisely this – derive estimates from national datasets in a way that exploits the strengths of 
each countries data.   The main objective was to evaluate the private returns to education by 
estimating the relationship between wages and education across Europe. In a cross-country 
project it is preferable that data is reasonably comparable across countries, i.e. wage, years of  
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Table 2.1 Cross Country Evidence on the Returns to Schooling – ISSP 1995 
 Male Female 
Australia 0.0509 0.0042 0.0568 0.0071 
West Germany 0.0353 0.0020 0.0441 0.0036 
Great Britain 0.1299 0.0057 0.1466 0.0069 
USA 0.0783 0.0045 0.0979 0.0058 
Austria 0.0364 0.0033 0.0621 0.0049 
Italy 0.0398 0.0025 0.0568 0.0036 
Hungary 0.0699 0.0053 0.0716 0.0051 
Switzerland 0.0427 0.0065 0.0523 0.0143 
Poland 0.0737 0.0044 0.1025 0.0046 
Netherlands 0.0331 0.0025 0.0181 0.0050 
Rep of Ireland 0.1023 0.0051 0.1164 0.0081 
Israel 0.0603 0.0069 0.0694 0.0077 
Norway 0.0229 0.0025 0.0265 0.0032 
N Ireland 0.1766 0.0111 0.1681 0.0127 
East Germany 0.0265 0.0032 0.0450 0.0041 
New Zealand 0.0424 0.0050 0.0375 0.0058 
Russia 0.0421 0.0042 0.0555 0.0043 
Slovenia 0.0892 0.0104 0.1121 0.0091 
Sweden 0.0367 0.0047 0.0416 0.0047 
Bulgaria 0.0495 0.0100 0.0624 0.0091 
Canada 0.0367 0.0072 0.0498 0.0083 
Czech Rep 0.0291 0.0069 0.0454 0.0077 
Japan 0.0746 0.0066 0.0917 0.0151 
Spain 0.0518 0.0071 0.0468 0.0099 
Slovakia 0.0496 0.0070 0.0635 0.0078 
Note: Standard Errors in italics. 
 
schooling and experience should be calculated in a similar fashion.  However, since each 
country uses their own national surveys, this condition is hard to meet exactly.  All PURE 
partners adopted a common specification and estimated the return to education using log of 
the hourly gross wage where available5 6.   Figure 2.5 is a summary of the returns broken 
down by gender.  We find that for some countries like the UK, Ireland, Germany, Greece and 
Italy there is a substantial variation in returns between genders, - the returns to women are 
 
5  Austria, Netherlands, Greece, Spain, and Italy use net wages. 
6  Further details will be available in Harmon, Walker and Westergard-Nielsen (2001). An alternative to using 
ISSP or the 15 different datasets that lie behind Figure 2.5 is to use Eurostat’s ECHP (European Community 
Household Panel). The advantage of ECHP is obviously that each variable has been specified the same way, 
regardless of the country. The disadvantage, however, is that ECHP is inferior to most of the register based 
datasets used in this study in terms of reliability (quality) and number of observations (quantity). 
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significantly higher than the returns to men. Scandinavia (Norway, Sweden, and Denmark) is 
characterized by relatively low returns. Again the UK is close to the top of the estimated 
returns in this cross-country review. 
Figure 2.5 Returns to schooling in Europe, men and women (year closest to 1995) 
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2.5 Specification and Functional Form  
Mincer’s specification can be thought of as an approximation to a more general 
function of schooling (S) and experience (x) of the form: ( ) exSFw += ,log  where e is a 
random term that captures other (unobservable) determinants of wages. Many variants of the 
form of F(.) have been tried.  Murphy and Welch (1990), for example, concluded that 
exgrSw +++= )(log βX  where X are individual observable characteristics that affects 
wages and g(.) was a 3rd or 4th order polynomial of the experience measure, provided the best 
approximation for the model. However, there are no examples in the empirical literature that 
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suggest that the way in which x enters the model has any substantial impact on the estimated 
schooling coefficient, 
 However, experience is seldom well measured in typical datasets and is often proxied 
by age minus the age left education, or even just by age alone. Note that to compare the 
specification that uses age with one that uses recorded or potential experience one needs to 
adjust for the difference in what is being held constant: the effect of S on log wages - holding 
age constant is simply r, while the experience-control specification implies that the estimate 
of education on wages that hold age constant needs to be reduced by the effects of S on 
experience – that is, one needs to subtract the effect of a year of experience7. Table 2.2 
illustrates the effect of including different experience measures in schooling returns 
estimation.  Here we use the pooled FRS data and data from the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) to show that the estimated return to education varies little with the experience 
measure in the context of a multivariate regression.  In this table we report estimates based on 
ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques controlling for different definitions of experience 
where experience is introduced as a quadratic term as suggested by the Mincer specification.  
Using a quadratic in age tends to produce the lowest returns of approximately 8% 
(6.5%) for men and 11% (10.3%) for women in FRS (BHPS).  Using potential experience 
(age minus education leaving age) or actual experience (recorded in the data as the weighted 
sum of the number of years of part-time and full-time work since leaving full-time education) 
indicates a slightly higher return to education of, for example, 10% for men and 12% for 
 
iu
)
7 If the wage equation is  then the adjustment is to subtract 2   log   +  + +  + i i i iw rS x xβ δ γ= iX
(2 A Sδ γ− − . Since the average value of A-S is around 25, and (for men) δ is about 0.05 and γ is about –
0.0005 the adjustment is small . 
 24
women in FRS. However, the sample sizes are large and the estimates are very precise so 
even these small differences are generally statistically significant8. 
Table 2.2   FRS and BHPS:  Sensitivity of OLS Results to the Experience Measure 
Men Women Definition  
of Experience: Education Experience Experience2 Education Experience Experience2 
 
FRS 
      
Age 
 
0.079 
(0.001) 
0.089 
(0.003) 
-0.0010 
(0.00004) 
0.108 
(0.002) 
0.023 
(0.003) 
-0.0003 
(0.00004) 
Potential 
experience 
0.094 
(0.001) 
0.051 
(0.001) 
-0.0009 
(0.00003) 
0.115 
(0.002) 
0.021 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.00003) 
Actual 
experience 
0.096 
(0.001) 
0.051 
(0.001) 
-0.0009 
(0.00003) 
0.122 
(0.001) 
0.042 
(0.001) 
-0.0007 
(0.00004) 
 
BHPS 
      
Age 
 
0.064 
(0.002) 
0.076 
(0.005) 
-0.0008 
(0.00006) 
0.103 
(0.002) 
0.040 
(0.005) 
-0.0005 
(0.00006) 
Potential 
experience 
0.076 
(0.002) 
0.043 
(0.002) 
-0.0008 
(0.00005) 
0.106 
(0.003) 
0.017 
(0.002) 
-0.0003 
(0.00004) 
Actual 
experience 
0.078 
(0.002) 
0.043 
(0.002) 
-0.0008 
(0.00004) 
0.116 
(0.002) 
0.031 
(0.002) 
-0.0006 
(0.00005) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. The models include year dummies. 
 
 The UK is by no means an outlier in this respect.  In Table 2.3 we illustrate this point 
using our European estimates of the returns to schooling.  We estimate the simple model 
separately for men and women using potential experience, actual experience, and using age.  
Again using potential experience is generally associated with slightly higher returns than 
when using age.  However returns when estimated in a model using potential experience are 
not significantly different from returns estimated using actual experience.  
 
8 The adjustment suggested in the previous footnote suggests that the age-constant estimates of the effect of a 
year of education are smaller than even these small raw differences suggest 
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Table 2.3 Returns to Education in Europe (year closest to 1995). 
 MEN WOMEN 
Definition of control 
for experience: 
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Age Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Age 
Austria (95) 0.069  0.059 0.067  0.058 
Denmark (95) 0.064 0.061 0.056 0.049 0.043 0.044 
Germany (West) (95) 0.079 0.077 0.067 0.098 0.095 0.087 
Netherlands (96) 0.063 0.057 0.045 0.051 0.042 0.037 
Portugal (94)(95) 0.097 0.100 0.079 0.097 0.104 0.077 
Sweden (91) 0.041 0.041 0.033 0.038 0.037 0.033 
France  (95) 0.075  0.057 0.081  0.065 
UK (94-96) 0.094 0.096 0.079 0.115 0.122 0.108 
Ireland (94) 0.090 0.088 0.065 0.137 0.129 0.113 
Italy (95) 0.062 0.058 0.046 0.077 0.070 0.061 
Norway  0.046 0.045 0.037 0.050 0.047 0.044 
Finland (93) 0.086 0.085 0.072 0.088 0.087 0.082 
Spain (94) 0.072 0.069 0.055 0.084 0.079 0.063 
Switzerland (95) 0.090 0.089 0.076 0.095 0.089 0.086 
Greece (94) 0.063  0.040 0.086  0.064 
Mean 0.073 0.072 0.058 0.081 0.079 0.068 
 Source: Information collected in the PuRE group by Rita Asplund (ETLA, Helsinki). 
Other changes in specification generally do not lead to major changes in the estimated 
return to schooling.  For example in Table 2.4 and 2.5 we estimate for men and women the 
return to schooling using BHPS including a range of different controls including union 
membership and plant size, part-time status, marital status and family size9.   As can be seen 
the results here are very robust to these different range of controls. 
 
9 Controls for occupation were not included. Typically occupation controls result in the estimated return to 
education being reduced because the estimate is then conditional on occupation. Part, perhaps much, of the 
returns to education is due to being able to achieve higher occupational levels rather than affecting wages within 
an occupation. 
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Table 2.4 Men in BHPS: Sensitivity to Changes in Control Variables 
 None Plant size 
and union 
Children and 
marriage 
Part-time 
 
Children 
marriage 
and PT 
Plant size 
union, and 
PT 
All 
controls 
Education 0.064 
(0.002) 
0.062 
(0.002) 
0.065 
(0.002) 
0.064 
(0.002) 
0.065 
(0.002) 
0.062 
(0.002) 
0.063 
(0.002) 
Medium Plant  - 
 
0.157 
(0.012) 
- - - 0.157 
(0.012) 
0.153 
(0.012) 
Large Plant - 
 
0.241 
(0.013) 
- - - 0.242 
(0.012) 
0.243 
(0.013) 
Union member - 
 
0.079 
(0.011) 
- - - 0.079 
(0.011) 
0.080 
(0.011) 
No. of children - 
 
- 0.017 
(0.006) 
- 0.017 
(0.006) 
- 0.019 
(0.005) 
Married - 
 
- 0.144 
(0.016) 
- 0.145 
(0.016) 
- 0.144 
(0.016) 
Co-habit - 
 
- 0.095 
(0.020) 
- 0.095 
(0.020) 
- 0.107 
(0.020) 
Divorced - 
 
- 0.050 
(0.025) 
- 0.050 
(0.025) 
- 0.058 
(0.024) 
Part-time - 
 
- - -0.020 
(0.041) 
-0.007 
(0.041) 
0.024 
(0.039) 
0.036 
(0.040) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. The models include age and age squared, year dummies, 
region dummies, and regional unemployment rates.  
 
Table 2.5 Women in BHPS: Sensitivity to Changes in Control Variables 
 None Plant size 
and union 
Children and 
marriage 
Part-time 
 
Children 
marriage 
and PT 
Plant size 
union, and 
PT 
All 
controls 
Education 0.103 
(0.002) 
0.095 
(0.002) 
0.101 
(0.002) 
0.097 
(0.002) 
0.097 
(0.002) 
0.092 
(0.002) 
0.092 
(0.002) 
Medium Plant  - 
 
0.158 
(0.010) 
- - - 0.130 
(0.010) 
0.130 
(0.010) 
Large Plant - 
 
0.258 
(0.012) 
- - - 0.217 
(0.012) 
0.216 
(0.012) 
Union member - 
 
0.214 
(0.012) 
- - - 0.197 
(0.012) 
0.195 
(0.012) 
No. of children - 
 
- -0.077 
(0.006) 
- -0.037 
(0.006) 
- -0.032 
(0.006) 
Married - 
 
- 0.001 
(0.018) 
- 0.029 
(0.018) 
- 0.025 
(0.018) 
Co-habit - 
 
- 0.021 
(0.022) 
- 0.024 
(0.022) 
- 0.025 
(0.021) 
Divorced - 
 
- -0.009 
(0.023) 
- -0.002 
(0.022) 
- 0.003 
(0.021) 
Part-time - 
 
- - -0.220 
(0.009) 
-0.197 
(0.011) 
-0.165 
(0.009) 
-0.156 
(0.010) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. The models include age and age squared, year dummies, 
region dummies, and regional unemployment rates. 
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 A further point relates to the issue of using samples of working employees for the 
purposes of estimating these returns.  To what extent is the return to schooling biased by 
estimation being based only on these workers?  This has typically thought not to be such an 
issue for men as for women since voluntary non-participation is thought to be much less 
common for men than women.  There are two ways of illuminating the extent to which the 
estimated education return may be affected by this sample selection. One might compare 
OLS estimates with estimates of "median" regressions. Bias in OLS arises because 
individuals with low productivity tend to predominate amongst non-participants. Thus, using 
a selected sample of workers is to truncate the bottom of the wage distribution and hence 
raise the mean of the distribution over what it would otherwise be if no selection took place. 
Since OLS passes through the mean of the estimating sample it will be affected by the 
truncation in the data. However, the median of the data is unaffected by the truncation so 
there should be no bias in median regressions.  Secondly, one could also use standard “two-
step” estimation methods as proposed by Heckman et al. (1974), which attempt to control for 
the selection by modelling what determines it.    
Table 2.6 BHPS and FRS: OLS, Heckman Selection, and Median Regression 
 FRS Women BHPS Women 
 Education Age Age2 Education Age Age2 
OLS 0.109 
(0.002) 
0.026 
(0.003) 
-0.0003 
(0.00004) 
0.103 
(0.002) 
0.040 
(0.005) 
-0.0005 
(0.0001) 
Heckman 
two-step 
0.109 
(0.002) 
0.016 
(0.004) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.102 
(0.003) 
0.060 
(0.006) 
-0.0007 
(0.0001) 
Median 
regression 
0.122 
(0.002) 
0.024 
(0.004) 
-0.0003 
(0.00004) 
0.118 
(0.002) 
0.034 
(0.005) 
-0.0003 
(0.0001) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. The models include year dummies, marital status, and 
the number of children in three age ranges, region dummies, and regional unemployment rate. In the Heckman 
two-step case we use household unearned income as well as the variables from the wage equation in the 
participation equation. 
 Table 2.6 shows the parameter estimates for women using BHPS and FRS.  The 
results show slightly higher returns under the median regression method suggesting a small 
effect due to the selection into employment.  While statistically significant the differences are 
small in absolute value.   
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Since non-participation is more common amongst women than men we might imagine 
that the returns to women would be biased downwards relative to men and the size of this 
bias may depend on the relative participation rates.  Figure 2.6 examines the relationship 
between the average participation rate for women in employment and the percentage 
difference between male and female returns to schooling for the countries in the PURE 
network. The figure shows that countries with the highest rates of female participation 
(typically the Nordic grouping) have the lowest differences in schooling returns10 while the 
countries with the lowest participation (including Ireland and the UK) have the largest. This 
suggests that there is some bias from using samples of participants alone but it appears not to 
be large. However, the issue merits more attention than it has received in the literature to 
date.   
Figure 2.6 Female/Male Differentials in Returns and Female Participation Rate 
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10   We are grateful to Jens Jakob Christensen for assistance in compiling the data for this figure. 
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2.6 Alternative Measures of Schooling Attainment 
Measuring schooling in terms of years of education has a long history in the US.  
There are practical reasons for this as years of schooling is the measure recorded in the major 
datasets such as the Census and, pre 1990, the Current Population Survey (CPS).  Moreover 
schooling in the US does not follow a nationally (or state) based credential system but is one 
where grades generally follow years, so education is a fairly continuous variable at least up to 
high school graduation.  However in Europe there are alternative streams that may lead to the 
quite different credentials as outcomes. Estimation based on credentials rather than years of 
schooling is therefore an alternative structure for recovering the returns to schooling.   
However this is only necessary if the wage return from increments of education deviates from 
linearity in years of education.  Consider a comparison of two measures of the returns to 
schooling; one based on years of schooling and another based on dummy variables for the 
highest level of schooling completed.  If the extra (or marginal) return to a three year degree 
programme compared to leaving school with A-levels is approximately three times the 
estimated return to a year of A-level schooling then the linear specification in years of 
schooling is equivalent to the alternative based on the credential.   
 Some argue that credentials matter more than years of schooling – the so-called  
“sheepskin” effect.  For example there may be a wage premium over the average return to 
schooling for fulfilling a particular year of education (such as the final year of college, or 
high school).  Hungerford and Solon (1987) demonstrate the existence of these nonlinearities.  
Park (1999) also notes a deviation from linearity in the returns to years of schooling between 
the completion of high school and the completion of college/university. His estimates suggest 
that the marginal return to schooling is not constant but rather ‘dips’ between these two 
important transition points. 
 30
 Figure 2.7 illustrates this point using the FRS data for 1994 to 1997.  The dashed lines 
represent the estimated return to years of schooling based on an OLS specification.  The solid 
lines plot the return to schooling based on the inclusion of dummy variables for each 
corresponding leaving age.  There appear to be clear effects at age 18 and age 21 most likely 
corresponding to the completion of A-levels and the completion of university. 
Figure 2.7 Sheepskin Effects in FRS 94-97 
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 However, Figure 2.8 illustrates how the underlying assumption of linearity, while a 
strong assumption, is nonetheless remarkably hard to reject.  In this figure we plot the 
average return for a number of popular credentials in the UK data (including apprenticeships, 
national vocational qualifications and other forms of education) against the average number 
of years of schooling for holders of these credentials.  From fitting a simple regression 
through these points we see that a linear form seems to be a reasonable approximation so that 
the average returns to a year of schooling is about 16% for women and 9% for men. 
An important question is how to allow for the affect of vocational qualifications 
obtained outside of formal schooling – for example, qualifications obtained while in full-time 
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work. Nursing qualifications are an example. The age left full-time schooling is not a good 
guide to the human capital of such individuals and, to the extent that such vocational 
qualifications add to productivity and wages, this will induce our estimated return to 
education to be biased downwards. 
Figure 2.8 Estimated Returns to Qualifications – BHPS 
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2.7 Variation in the Returns to Education across the Wage Distribution 
It is possible that the returns to schooling may be different for individuals in the upper 
part of the wage distribution as compared to individuals in the lower portion of the wage 
distribution. One of the properties of OLS estimation is that the regression line contains or 
passes through the mean of the sample.  An alternative methodology to OLS is available 
known as quantile regression (QR) which, based on the entire sample available, allows us to 
estimate the return to education within different quantiles of the wage distribution.  While 
OLS captures the effect of education on someone on the mean wage, the idea behind QR is to 
look at the returns at some other part of the wage distribution, say the bottom quartile. Then 
comparing the estimated returns across the whole of the wage distribution we can infer the 
extent to which education exacerbates or reduces underlying inequality. Of course, the 
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method requires that there is a sufficiently wide spread of education that we can identify the 
returns for each decile – we require that some in the top deciles have low education and some 
in the bottom deciles have high education. The UK data appears to be satisfactory in this 
respect and we find that the return is statistically significant for each decile, and we also find 
that the top decile is significantly higher than the bottom decile. The method is fully flexible 
and allows the returns in each decile to be independent of any other decile. Our simple 
specification does restrict the returns to be the same for everyone within the decile group – 
just as our OLS linear specification restricts the returns to be the same for the whole sample. 
 Figure 2.9 presents the average OLS return to schooling (from FES data for 1980, 
1985, 1990 and 1995) together with the returns to schooling in different deciles of the wage 
distribution.  The OLS figures show that over the four half-decades the returns to schooling, 
on average, have broadly increased, especially between 1980 and 1985. There is a clear 
implication in this figure that the returns to schooling are higher for those at the very top of 
the wage distribution compared to those at the very bottom (although the profiles are flat 
across the middle range of the wage distribution). The returns at the bottom of the distribution 
seem to have risen across this period which is shown by the graph getting flatter, and there is 
some suggestion, comparing the 1980’s with the 1990’s, that the returns have risen at the top 
of the distribution. One factor behind the distribution of wages is the distribution of inherent 
ability so that lower ability individuals predominate in the bottom half of the distribution. 
Thus education appears to have a bigger impact on the more able than the less able and this 
complimentarity between ability and education seems to have become larger over time.   
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Figure 2.9 Quantile Regressions for GB: FES Men  
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Source: Harmon, Walker and Westergard-Nielsen (2001) 
 
Table 2.7 Quantile Regressions  
 Year 1st dec. 9th dec. OLS Year 1st dec. 9th dec. OLS 
Austria 1981 9.2 12.6 10.5 1993 7.2 12.8 9.7 
Denmark 1980 4.7 5.3 4.6 1995 6.3 7.1 6.6 
Finland 1987 7.3 10.3 9.5 1993 6.8 10.1 8.9 
France 1977 5.6 9.8 7.5 1993 5.9 9.3 7.6 
Germany 1984 9.4 8.4  1995 8.5 7.5  
Greece 1974 6.5 5.4 5.8 1994 7.5 5.6 6.5 
Italy 1980 3.9 4.6 4.3 1995 6.7 7.1 6.4 
Ireland 1987 10.1 10.4 10.2 1994 7.8 10.4 8.9 
Netherlands 1979 6.5 9.2 8.6 1996 5.3 8.3 7.0 
Norway 1983 5.3 6.3 5.7 1995 5.5 7.5 6.0 
Portugal 1982 8.7 12.4 11.0 1995 6.7 15.6 12.6 
Spain 1990 6.4 8.3 7.2 1995 6.7 9.1 8.6 
Sweden 1981 3.2 6.6 4.7 1991 2.4 6.2 4.1 
Switzerland 1992 8.2 10.7 9.6 1998 6.3 10.2 9.0 
UK 1980 2.5 7.4 6.7 1995 4.9 9.7 8.6 
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Table 2.7 is also based on the work of the PURE11 research group.  In most countries 
and for most years it would seem that there is complementarity between education and ability 
and that this is either getting stronger or, at least, no weaker over time. 
2.8 Summary of the Results  
 To summarize the various issues discussed above we use the methods common in 
meta-analysis to provide some structure to our survey of returns to schooling and to provide a 
framework to determine whether our inferences are sensitive to specification choices.  A 
meta-analysis combines and integrates the results of several studies that share a common 
aspect so as to be 'combinable' in a statistical manner. The methodology is typical in the 
clinical trials in the medical literature.  In its simplest form the computation of the average 
return across a number of studies is now achieved by weighting the contribution of an 
individual study to the average on the basis of the standard error of the estimate (see 
Ashenfelter, Harmon and Oosterbeek (1999) for further details).  
 In Figure 2.10 we present the findings of a simple meta-analysis based on the 
collected OLS estimated rates of return to schooling from the PURE project supplemented by 
a number of findings for the US.   Well over 1000 estimates were generated across the PURE 
project on three main types of estimated return to schooling - existing published work 
(labelled PURE1 in the figure), existing unpublished work (labelled PURE2), and new 
estimates produced for the PURE project (labelled PURE3).  Each block refers to a different 
sample of studies that share some characteristic (for example, “US” indicates only studies 
 
11  We are grateful to Pedro Pereira and Pedro Silva Martins for providing this information. 
 35
based on US originated studies, “Net wages” indicates that the dependent variable was net 
rather than gross ages, and “Ability” indicates that ability controls were included).   
Figure 2.10 Returns to Schooling  – A Meta Analysis  
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A number of points emerge from the figure.  Despite the points raised earlier in this 
chapter there is a remarkable similarity in the estimated return to schooling for a number of 
possible cuts of the data with an average return of around 6.5% across the majority of 
countries and model specifications.  There are number of notable exceptions.  That Nordic 
countries generally have lower returns to schooling is confirmed while at the other extreme 
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the returns for the UK and Ireland are indeed higher than average.  In addition estimated 
returns from studies of public sector workers, and from studies where net (of tax) wages are 
only available average about 5%12.   Estimates produced using samples from the 1960’s also 
seem to have produced higher than average returns.   
2.9 Other Sources of Variation in Returns: Quality vs. Quantity 
Numerous studies have considered the link between school-quality and earnings.  Our 
concern here is, not so much with whether school quality “matters”, but that high levels of 
schooling may be associated with a high quality school experience. Thus, the S coefficient in 
traditional wage regressions may pick up both the effect of quantity and of quality, as this 
would imply an upward bias to the estimated education quantity effect.   
 Studies such as Johnson and Stafford (1973) defined the research agenda in this area 
suggesting strong quality/earnings links where controls for quality using state-level data 
matched to microdata were included.  On the other hand, the effects of school quality on 
outcomes such as educational attainment and earnings have been studied extensively by 
Hanushek (see his meta-study in 1992) that has been interpreted as implying that “quality 
doesn’t matter”. However more recently a new consensus has emerged, as expressed in Betts 
(1996), that the early studies may have overstated the quality effect, and note that the quality 
effect may not be stable over time. The more recent contributions in the literature, as 
reviewed in Card and Krueger (1996), suggest small effects of school inputs on wages. In 
particular, there is some evidence from “natural experiments” as well as real experiments 
now available that suggest there is some effect of quality.  Card and Krueger (1997) exploit 
 
12  Note that we would expect the net returns to be lower than gross by an amount approximately equal to the 
average tax rate. 
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the differential changes in class sizes that occurred over time between North and South 
Carolina.  Angrist and Lavy (1997) exploit the rule in Israeli schools that an extra teacher 
must be added every time the class size exceeds 40.  Harmon and Walker (2000) exploit the 
changes in school selection rules that were changed at different times in different areas in the 
UK in the 1960/70’s on wages and find significant effects (but not of class size at secondary 
level).  Finally, the STAR experiment in Tennessee randomly allocated children to either 
smaller classes or to classes with a teacher assistant and compared the outcomes with a 
control group. In each of these cases there were statistically significant quality effects, 
although usually the size of the effects were small casting doubt on the economic 
effectiveness of quality investments. 
 Thus, it seems likely that our estimates of the returns to the quantity of schooling are 
not greatly affected by the omission of quality. Indeed, in Harmon and Walker (2000) the 
effects of quantity seemed quite robust to the inclusion of quality controls. 
2.10 Other Sources of Variation in Returns: Over-Education 
Given the increase in the supply of educated workers in most OECD countries in the 
last two decades a concern has arisen in the schooling returns literature that if growth in the 
supply of educated workers outpaces the demand for these workers, overeducation in the 
workforce is the likely result.  In other words the skills workers will bring to their work will 
exceed the skills required for the job.  Mason (1996) suggests that 45% of UK graduates are 
in ‘non mainstream’ graduate jobs.  The manifestation of this for the worker is a lower return 
to years of education that are somehow surplus to those needed for the job. In order to 
analyse this issue total years of schooling for individuals must be split into required years and 
surplus years of education.  The difference in the returns to these measures is a measure of 
overeducation.   
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 There are a number of ways of measuring overeducation: subjective definitions based 
on self-reported responses to a direct question to workers on whether they are overeducated; 
or the difference between actual schooling of the worker and the schooling needed for their 
job as reported by the worker.  Clearly these may be open to measurement error.  Moreover 
the educational requirement for new workers may exceed those of older workers in a given 
firm.  Alternatively a more objective measure can be derived from comparing years of 
education of the worker with the average for the occupation category as a whole or the job 
level requirement for the position held.  This is often criticized for the choice of classification 
for the occupation, which, depending on the industry SIC digit level chosen may mix workers 
in jobs requiring different levels of education.  Moreover required levels of education are 
typically the minimum required and not necessarily indicative of the level of education of the 
successful candidate.   
 Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) show the often conflicting results from this 
literature based on a meta-analysis of the returns to education and overeducation literature 
(some 50 studies in total).  A total of 26% of studies show evidence that a statistically 
significant difference in the returns to required years and surplus years exists.  The meta 
regression analysis found that when over-education is defined by comparison with the 
average years of schooling within occupation categories the incidence of overeducation falls.  
The average return to required years of education is 7.9% but this rises when more recent 
data is used or when required education is defined by self-reported methods.  The average 
return to over-education or surplus years in excess of the requirement for the job is 2.6%.     
 Dolton and Vignoles (2000) test three hypotheses regarding overeducation for the UK 
graduate labour market based on the National Survey of 1980 Graduates and Diplomates 
which asks the respondents what the minimum requirement for the position currently held 
was.  The first test, that the return to surplus years of education is the same as the return to 
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required years of education, is conclusively rejected by the data.   New graduates that were 
overeducated earned considerably less than those in graduate jobs with the penalty greatest in 
jobs with the lowest required qualifications.  The penalty was also higher for women.   The 
second test is that the return to surplus education differs by degree class.   This is rejected – 
those who are overeducated with first or upper second-class degrees earn the same as those 
overeducated with a lower class of degree.  Their final test is that the returns to surplus 
education differ between sectors, specifically between the public and private sectors, and 
again this is rejected.   Dolton and Vignoles (2000) conclude therefore that the return to 
surplus education based on their measure is lower than for required education and that this 
cannot be explained by difference in degree class or differences in employment sector.   
 Chevalier (2000) deals directly with the definition of overeducation by noting that 
graduates with similar qualifications are not homogeneous in their endowment of skills 
leading to a variation in ability, which may lead to an over-estimation of the extent and effect 
of over-education on earnings.  A sample of two cohorts of UK graduates is used collected by 
a postal survey organised by the University of Birmingham in 1996 among graduates from 30 
higher education institutions covering the range of UK institutions.  Graduates from the 1985 
and 1990 cohorts were selected, leading to a sample of 18,000 individuals.  By using 
measures of job satisfaction this study is able to sub-divide those considered ‘over-educated’ 
into ‘apparently’ and ‘genuinely’ over-educated.  The apparently over-qualified group is paid 
nearly 6% less than well-matched graduates but this pay penalty disappears when a measure 
of ability is introduced.  Genuinely over-qualified graduates have a reduced probability of 
getting training and suffer from a pay penalty reaching as high as 33%.   Thus genuine over-
education appears to be associated with a lack of skills that can explain 30% to 40% of the 
pay differential but much of what is normally defined as over-education is more apparent 
than real. 
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3. Signalling 
An important issue to address is the extent to which the estimates of returns to 
education reflect not just the productivity enhancing effect of education but an effect on 
earnings of the underlying ability that education signals. This idea stems from work by 
Spence (1970). There is a fundamental difficulty in unravelling the extent to which education 
is a signal of existing productivity as opposed to enhancing productivity: both theories are 
observationally equivalent – they both suggest that there is a positive correlation between 
earnings and education, but for very different reasons.  
 There are three approaches to finessing this problem.  One would attempt to control 
for ability and see if education still has as strong an effect on earnings – any difference could 
be attributed to the signalling value of education. A variation on this approach would be to 
estimate the education/earnings relationship for the self-employed, where education has no 
value as a signal since individuals know their own productivity and have no need to signal it 
to themselves by acquiring more education, or for public sector employees which is less 
competitive and hence can afford to have pay differ from productivity. Thus the difference 
between the returns to education for employees vs. the self-employed or between public vs 
private sector employees is the value of education as a signal. A second approach would be to 
compare estimated returns which control for ability with those that do not. Since education is 
correlated with wages fro both human capital and because it is a signal of ability then 
including ability controls should account for the latter effect and then the education variable 
just picks up the effect via human capital. DfEE’s evidence in the Dearing Report referred to 
the discount for the signalling value of education as  α and thought that the observed returns 
to education ought to be discounted by an α-factor of between 0 and 0.4.  However there is 
precious little evidence available in the literature and the paucity of the literature is testament 
to the difficulty of the problem.  
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 In Table 3.1 British Household Panel Survey data, which contains information on 
whether, one's parents were self-employed and on housing equity both of which are likely to 
be associated with self-employment (but are not likely to be very well correlated with current 
wages). The results here suggest quite comparable rates of return and imply that the 
signalling component is quite small.  The main problem with the self-employed/employee 
distinction is that self-employment is not random - individuals with specific (and typically 
unobservable) characteristics choose to be self-employed).  Thus, the bottom half of the table 
show the effects of education on wages when we use the Heckman two-step method to 
control for unobservable differences between employees and the self-employed. The results 
are essentially unchanged. 
Table 3.1 Signalling – Returns for Employed vs. Self-Employed - BHPS 
 Employees Self-employed  
 Return N Return N Signalling value 
BHPS – OLS      
Men 0.0641 (0.002) 10001 0.0514 (0.008) 1717 0.0131 (0.012) 
Women 0.1027 (0.002) 9550 0.0763 (0.015) 563 0.0264 (0.019) 
BHPS - Heckman      
Men 0.0691 (0.003) 10001 0.0552 (0.022) 1717 0.0139 (0.025) 
Women 0.1032 (0.002) 9550 0.0784 (0.066) 563 0.0248 (0.070) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. The models include year dummies, marital status, and 
the number of children in three age ranges, region dummies, and regional unemployment rates. The Heckman 
selectivity estimates use father self-employed, mother self-employed, and housing equity as instruments.  
 The second approach to distinguishing between ability and productivity is to directly 
include ability measures. The main problem with the ability controls method is that the ability 
measures need to be uncontaminated by the effects of education or they will pick up the 
productivity enhancing effects of education.  Moreover, the ability measures need to indicate 
ability to make money rather than ability in an IQ sense.  It seems unlikely that any ability 
measure would be able to satisfy both of these requirements exactly and we pursue the issue 
here with two specialised datasets.  The GB National Child Development Survey (NCDS) is a 
cohort study of all individuals born in GB in a particular week in 1958 whose early 
development was followed closely and whose subsequent careers have been recorded 
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including earnings.  Various ability tests were conducted at the ages of 7, 11 and 16. The 
International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) datasets record earnings and ability at the time of 
interview.  In the IALS data the literacy level is measured on three scales: prose, document 
and quantitative, taken at the age the respondent is when surveyed. Prose literacy is the 
knowledge required to understand and use information from texts, such as newspapers, 
pamphlets and magazines.  Document literacy is the knowledge and skill needed to use 
information from specific formats, for example from maps, timetables and payroll forms.  
Quantitative literacy is defined as the ability to use mathematical operations, such as in 
calculating a tip or compound interest.  
 In order to provide an actual measure of literacy each individual was given a score for 
each task, which varied depending on the difficulty of the assignment.  Scores for each scale 
ranges from 0-500, which is subsequently subdivided into five levels.  Level 1 has a score 
range from 0-225 and would indicate very low levels where, for example, instructions for a 
medicine prescription would not be understood.  The interval 226-275 defines Level 2 where 
individuals are limited to handling material that is not too complex and clearly defined.  
Level 3 ranges from 276-325 and is considered the minimum desirable threshold for most 
countries while Level 4 (326-375) and Level 5 (376-500) show increasingly higher skills 
which integrate several sources of information or solve complex problems13.  
 In Table 3.2 we provide estimates from NCDS and IALS data that control for a 
variety of ability variables.  In NCDS, we use the results of Maths and English ability tests at 
age 7 as controls and show the estimated rates of returns for men and women separately. We 
compare these results with using controls at age 11 and at age 16, and current age using 
 
13   See Dearden et al (2000) for further detailed analysis of these datasets. 
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IALS.  As we expect, using ability controls at later ages confounds the effects of education on 
ability scores and the apparent bias appears to be larger. Thus, the results at age 7 are 
probably our most accurate estimates of the extent to which education is picking up innate 
ability and this is a rather small difference and suggests little signalling value to education. In 
the IALS work, following Cawley et al. (1996) we compute a combination of tests as a 
measure of functional literacy/cognitive ability14. We measure ability by taking the first 
principal component from the three test score vectors (for document literacy, prose literacy 
and quantitative literacy).  The principal component is a linear combination of the underlying 
variables which captures as much of the variation in the variables as possible.    
Table 3.2 Returns to Schooling by Gender in NCDS and IALS: Ability Controls 
  Without ability controls With ability controls 
NCDS - GB Women 0.107 (0.007) 0.100 (0.008) 
Controls at age 7 Men 0.061 (0.006) 0.051 (0.006) 
NCDS - GB Women 0.107 (0.007) 0.081 (0.009) 
Controls at age 11 Men 0.061 (0.006) 0.036 (0.007) 
NCDS - GB Women 0.107 (0.007) 0.071 (0.009) 
Controls at age 16 Men 0.061 (0.006) 0.026 (0.007) 
IALS – GB Women 0.106 (0.014) 0.077 (0.013) 
Current age controls Men 0.089 (0.009) 0.057 (0.009) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimating equations include a quadratic in age, and a monthly time trend. 
Ability controls in the NCDS equations are English and Maths test scores in quartiles; while in IALS they are 
the residual formed by regressing current age ability measures against schooling and age to purge these effects.  
 
In Table 3.3 and 3.4 we look in more detail for (age 7) ability effects in NCDS by 
including interactions between ability measures and education15. Each specification includes 
years of education, and the first specification (column 1) excludes parental controls for 
education. Specification 3 adds test score results to measure ability effects, while 
 
14   The resurgence of interest in this issue seems to stem from the Bell curve controversy of Herrnstein and 
Murray (1994) which examines a large number of correlations between social outcomes and scores from test 
batteries. 
15 See Harmon and Walker (2000) fro more details. 
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specification 4 adds these and interactions between ability and years of education (to allow 
ability to have a larger effect the longer one stays at school). While we find some significant 
effects of ability on wages the effect of education itself is reasonably robust to the inclusion 
of these variables again suggesting that education plays a largely productivity enhancing role. 
Table 3.3 NCDS Women: Ability, Parental Background and the Returns to Education 
 1 2 3 4 
Child's education 0.120 (0.006) 0.107 (0.007) 0.100 (0.008) 0.125 (0.016) 
Parental background No Yes Yes Yes 
Child ability measures 
Maths 25-50% - - 0.064 (0.033) 0.050 (0.038) 
Maths 50-75% - - 0.046 (0.032) 0.052 (0.039) 
Maths 75-100% - - 0.045 (0.037) 0.069 (0.046) 
English 25-50% - - 0.045 (0.039) 0.022 (0.042) 
English 50-75% - - 0.063 (0.032) 0.073 (0.038) 
English 75-100% - - 0.108 (0.037) 0.169 (0.046) 
Ability / child education interactions 
Maths 25-50% - - - 0.018 (0.024) 
Maths 50-75% - - - -0.003 (0.021) 
Maths 75-100% - - - -0.010 (0.022) 
English 25-50% - - - 0.022 (0.036) 
English 50-75%  - - - -0.029 (0.022) 
English 75-100% - - - -0.049 (0.022) 
Sample sizes 2739 1981 1981 1981 
Table 3.4 NCDS Men: Ability, Parental Background and the Returns to Education 
 1 2 3 4 
Education 0.075 (0.005) 0.061 (0.006) 0.051 (0.006) 0.087 (0.014) 
Parental background  No Yes Yes Yes 
Child Ability measures     
Maths 25-50% - - 0.023 (0.031) 0.023 (0.032) 
Maths 50-75% - - 0.067 (0.033) 0.064 (0.038) 
Maths 75-100% - - 0.108 (0.037) 0.090 (0.044) 
English 25-50% - - 0.006 (0.029) 0.011 (0.031) 
English 50-75% - - 0.068 (0.034) 0.082 (0.036) 
English 75-100% - - 0.107 (0.037) 0.193 (0.044) 
Education/ability interactions 
Maths 25-50% - - - 0.012 (0.018) 
Maths 50-75% - - - 0.013 (0.018) 
Maths 75-100% - - - 0.022 (0.018) 
English 25-50% - - - -0.026 (0.020) 
English 50-75% - - - -0.041 (0.022) 
English 75-100% - - - -0.079 (0.021) 
Sample sizes 3169 2319 2319 2319 
 
 Table 3.5 shows how the various scores in the GB and Northern Ireland IALS change 
against a number of individual and family controls based on a regression of the score against 
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the individual characteristics. As we would expect education has the largest effect.  However 
even the effect of a degree (compared to no qualification) on ability is just a little over one 
standard deviation but only about one-fifth of a standard deviation when compared to 
someone with A-levels.  Thus, a degree seems to have just a modest effect on ability in this 
sense. Family effects on ability are jointly significant but small in magnitude, with the effect 
of coming from a parental background with upper secondary or university education rarely 
raising any of the scores by more than 18 points (or about one-third of a standard deviation).  
Having controlled for education we find no differences in the ability levels of those in 
employment and those not working.  Similarly training has little direct effect (Denny and 
Harmon, 2000a).   
Table 3.5 What Determines Basic Skills?  Marginal Effects – GB and NI 1995.  
Explanatory Quantitative Document Prose 
variables GB NI GB NI GB NI 
Lower Secondary 27.7 20.6 26.5 15.0 29.5 24.1 
Higher Secondary 54.8 45.6 50.0 40.7 49.4 42.8 
Diploma/Certificate 64.2 57.0 61.4 51.9 64.6 57.9 
Degree 87.9 68.0 77.2 58.4 76.2 69.7 
Postgraduate 80.5 68.9 74.3 61.3 72.9 70.5 
Father-Lower Secondary 10.2 1.9 12.3 -1.4 15.7 -0.5 
Father-Higher Secondary 21.1 9.8 25.2 7.0 18.8 9.6 
Father-Diploma/Certificate 19.1 19.8 21.6 15.1 25.0 13.0 
Father-Degree 16.4 15.0 20.9 15.8 19.9 15.5 
Father-Postgraduate 10.3 9.4 17.3 13.3 21.9 0.8 
Mother-Lower Secondary -2.1 5.1 1.7 5.6 -2.7 6.0 
Mother-Higher Secondary 2.2 17.1 10.3 16.3 6.8 23.0 
Mother-Diploma/Certificate 2.1 15.3 11.0 26.4 9.5 16.2 
Mother-Degree 13.4 15.7 11.4 15.1 17.4 12.6 
Mother-Postgraduate 18.9 19.2 23.9 -9.1 26.6 -47.3 
Trained 15.7 17.4 21.0 19.6 21.5 20.0 
Employed 13.5 24.4 10.5 20.9 5.5 15.2 
Note: Significant determinants are in bold 
 Table 3.6 presents some earnings equation estimates for Great Britain16.  In these 
regressions, measures of ability are included in the specification.  However the included 
 
16   Earnings data in IALS are reported in intervals and hence we use the estimator proposed by Stewart (1983). 
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ability measure is the residual from a regression of the scores against the age, education and 
other characteristics of the individual (similar to the work that formed the basis of the 
discussion of Table 3.5).  By using this residual we are, as far as possible, purging the ability 
measure of the effect of being measured at the time of survey and not pre-schooling as in the 
NCDS regressions.   
 Specification (1) presents the simple wage equation without ability.  In specification 
(2) we introduce the ability measures for the three types of skill.  The measures of ability in 
themselves have small direct effects with quantitative literacy variables having the largest 
impact.  Returns to years of schooling are lower.  In specification (3) the single composite 
measure of literacy based on principal components is used (labelled functional literacy) and 
again we see a positive effect on earnings with the return to schooling reduced.   
 In order to quantify the effect of literacy using this composite measure it is useful to 
consider the distribution of the score and from this compute the wage penalty or premium.   
For the UK, the penalty from being in the first quartile of the ability distribution rather than at 
the median is 15% while the premium from being at the third quartile compared to the 
median is 13% suggesting a quite uniform distribution of the scores17.  The evidence 
therefore suggests that the direct return to ability is quantitaively small - individuals need to 
jump across quartiles of the score distribution (and to make these jumps individuals would 
require long periods of education as seen in Table 3.5)18. 
 
 
17  In comparison for Northern Ireland the penalty for being at the first quartile rather than the median is about 
10% and being at the 3rd quartile is worth 7.7% over the median.   
18   Dearden, McIntosk, Myck and Vignoles (2000), in an analysis of the IALS and NCDS find support for the 
general finding here that literacy and numeracy have a positive direct effect on earnings.  They suggest that it is 
the possession of a basic core level of skills that is crucial which supports our finding that while the returns are 
positive and statistically significant a large movement in the score is needed to generate economically 
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Table 3.6 Earnings and Ability in IALS,  GB  Men Aged 16-64 
 (1)  
GB Schooling Only 
(2)  
GB Schooling & Ability
(3)  
GB Schooling & Ability 
 Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. 
Years of Schooling  0.089 0.009 0.057 0.009 0.059 0.009 
Document Literacy -- -- -0.02 0.002 -- -- 
Prose Literacy -- -- 0.002 0.001 -- -- 
Quant Literacy -- -- 0.004 0.001 -- -- 
Functional Literacy (F.L) -- -- -- -- 0.058 0.007 
Sample size 988 988 988 
 
 It is possible, however, that the relationship between earnings and ability comes via 
the interaction between schooling and ability.  In Figure 3.1 we illustrate the results from 
allowing for such an interaction effect which is based on regressions of earnings on 
schooling, ability and an interaction between the schooling and ability for GB, Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.  The graph shows the effects of education on earnings at 
different parts of the ability distribution. It appears that the return to schooling is different 
across ability levels and that GB seems particularly sensitive to this.  The returns range from 
2.5% for the bottom decile of ability to 7% for the top decile.  This is evidence perhaps of 
what Cawley et al (1998) refer to as ‘dynamic complementarity’ and seems stronger in GB 
than in either NI or the Republic of Ireland. This evidence seems to substantiate the earlier 
quantile regression results. 
 
significant returns.  They also confirm that numeracy is more valued but that verbal ability is more important in 
raising the probability of employment. 
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Figure 3.1 Cognitive ability and the return to schooling.   
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4. Treatment Effects 
4.1 Isolating the Effect of Exogenous Variation in Schooling 
If you want to know how an individual’s earnings are affected by an extra year of 
schooling you would ideally compare an individual's earnings with N years of schooling with 
the same individual’s earnings after N+1 years of schooling.  The problem for researchers is 
only one of the two earnings levels of interest are observed and the other is unobserved  
(Harmon and Oosterbeek, 2000).   
The problem is analogous to those encountered in other fields, such as medical 
science: either a patient receives a certain treatment or not so observing the effectiveness of a 
treatment is difficult as all we actually observe is only the effect of treatment on those who 
are treated.  In medical studies the usual solution to this problem is by providing treatment to 
patients on the basis of random assignment.  In the context of education this is rarely feasible.  
However, there are still possibilities to tackle the problem, that the treated are not the same as 
the untreated in unobservable ways, and labour economists have made significant progress in 
this area in the past 10 years.  The key idea is to look for real-world events (as opposed to 
real experiments), which can be arguably considered as events that assign individuals 
randomly to different treatments. Randomly here has as its more precise definition that there 
is no relation between the event and the outcome of interest.  Such events have been dubbed 
“natural experiments” in the literature.  The essence of this natural experiment approach is to 
provide a suitable instrument for schooling which is not correlated with earnings and in doing 
so provide a close approximation to a randomized trial such as might be done in an 
experiment for a clinical study.   
 A very direct way of addressing the issue of the effect of an additional year of 
education on wages is to examine the wages of people who left school at 16 when the 
minimum school leaving was raised to 16 compared to the wages of those that left school at 
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15 just before the minimum was raised to 16. The FRS data is large enough for us to select 
the relevant cohort groups to allow us do this and Table 4.1 shows the relevant wages. 
Table 4.1 Wages and Minimum School Leaving Ages (£/hour) 
 Left at 15 pre 
RoSLA 
(1) 
Left at 16 pre 
RoSLA  
(2) 
Left at 16 
post RoSLA 
(3) 
% difference between 
(3) and (1) 
(4) 
% difference 
between (2) and (1) 
(5) 
Men 7.66 9.56 8.90 14.9 24.8 
Women 5.25 6.25 5.81 10.7 19.0 
Note: RoSLA refers to the “raising of the school leaving age” from 15 to 16, which occurred in 1974. 
 The effect of the treatment of having to stay on at school gives the magnitude of 
interest for policy work – the effect of additional schooling for those that would not have 
normally chosen an extra year. If we suppose that all those that left at 16 post RoSLA would 
have left at 15 had they been pre-RoSLA then we get a lower bound to the effect of the 
treatment: this is 14.9% for men and 10.7% for women. The former figure is very close to 
that obtained in Harmon and Walker (1995) using more complex multivariate methods.  In 
contrast the upper bound of the treatment is the effect of an additional year of schooling that 
had been chosen: this earned a larger premium of 24.8% for men and 19.0% for women 
which reflects the fact that these people who chose to leave at 16 are different people from 
those that left at 15 in terms of their other characteristics. 
 More formally the treatment group is chosen, not randomly, but independently of any 
characteristics that affect education. Thus, one could not, of course, group the data according 
to ability but grouping by cohort to capture a before and after affect may be legitimate.  The 
variable that defines the natural experiment can be thought of as a way of “cutting the data” 
so that the wages and education of one group can be compared with those of the other: that is, 
one can divide the between-group difference in wages by the difference in education to form 
an estimate of the returns to education. The important constraint is that the variable that 
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defines the sample separation is not, itself, correlated with education. There may be 
differences in observable variables between the groups -  so the treatment group may, for 
example, be taller than the control group – and since these differences may contribute to the 
differences in wages and/or education one might eliminate these by taking the differences 
over time within the groups and subtract the differences between the groups. Hence, the 
methodology is frequently termed the difference-in-differences method. 
 If the data can be grouped so that the differences between the levels of education in 
the two groups is random, then an estimate, known as a Wald estimate, of the returns to 
education can be found from dividing the differences in wages across the groups by the 
difference in the group average level of education.  
A potential example is to group observations according to their childhood smoking 
behaviour.  The argument for doing this is that smoking when young is a sign of having a 
high discount rate – since young smokers reveal that they are willing to incur the risk of long 
term damage for short term enjoyment. Information on smoking when young is contained in 
the General Household Survey for GB, for even years from 1978-96, and Table 4.2 shows 
that by examining these differences between groups the estimated return to schooling is 
around 16% for men and 18% for women.   
Table 4.2 Wald Estimates of the Return to Schooling – Grouped by Smoking 
Even GHS 78-96 Smoker 
(at 16) 
Non-smoker 
(at 16) 
Difference Wald Estimate 
Men Log Wage 2.36 2.51 0.16 
 Educ Yrs 12.11 13.08 0.97 
0.16/0.97 = 0.164 
Women Log Wage 2.01 2.18 0.17 
 Educ Yrs 12.52 13.42 0.90 
0.17/0.90 = 0.188 
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A closely related way of controlling for the differences in observable characteristics is 
to control for them using multivariate methods. This is the essence of the instrumental 
variables approach. That is the variable that is used for grouping could be used as an 
explanatory variable in determining the level of education. This is useful since it allows the 
use of multivariate methods to control for other observable differences between individuals 
with different levels of education. It is also useful in cases where the variable is continuous – 
the research can exploit the whole range of variation in the instrument rather than simply 
using it to categorise individuals into two (or more) groups.  By exploiting instruments for 
schooling that are uncorrelated with earnings the IV approach will generate unbiased 
estimates of the return to schooling.   
Consider the model iiii urSXw ++= βlog  where Si vi= +Z 'i α . Estimation of the 
log wage equation by OLS will yield an unbiased estimate of β only if the Si is exogenous, so 
that is there is no correlation between the two error terms.  If this condition is not satisfied 
alternative estimation methods must be employed since OLS will be biased.  The correlation 
might be nonzero because some important variables related to both schooling and earnings 
are omitted from the vector X.  Motivation, or other ability measures, besides IQ are 
examples. It is important to note that even a very extensive list of variables included in the 
vector X will never be exhaustive. An estimate of the return to schooling based on OLS will 
not give the causal effect of schooling on earnings19 as the schooling coefficient β captures 
some of the effects that would otherwise be attributed to the omitted ability variable.  For 
instance, if the omitted variable is motivation, and if both schooling and earnings are 
 
19 In this example the source of correlation between s and ε is that a relevant explanatory variable is omitted. 
Other sources for such correlation might be measurement error in s and self-selection bias.  
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positively correlated with motivation, OLS estimation ignores that more motivated persons 
are likely to earn more than less motivated persons even when they have similar amounts of 
schooling.   
 In order therefore to model the relationship between schooling and earnings we must 
use the schooling equation to compute the predicted or fitted value for schooling.  We then 
replace schooling in the earnings function with this predicted level.  As predicted schooling is 
correlated with actual schooling this replacement variable will still capture the effect of 
education on wages.   However there is no reason that predicted schooling will be correlated 
with the error term in the earnings function so the estimated return based on predicted 
schooling is unbiased.  This is the two-stage-least-squares method which is a special case of 
the instrumental variables (or IV) method and which captures its essence. 
 The difficulty for this procedure is one of “identification”.  In order to identify or 
isolate the effect of schooling on earnings we must focus our attention on providing variables 
in the vector Zi that are not contained in Xi 20 That is, there must exist a variable which is a 
determinant of schooling that can legitimately be omitted from the earnings equation. In 
essence this amounts to examining how wages differ between groups whose education is 
different for exogenous reasons. For example, some individuals may have faced a minimum 
school leaving age that differed from that faced by others, or may have started school at an 
earlier age for other reasons (that are uncorrelated with the wages eventually earned) such as 
having a high rate of time preference and this will be reflected in other youth behaviour such 
as smoking when young.  
 
20   See the discussion in Heckman (1990) for further details. 
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4.2 Results from IV Studies – International Evidence 
In Figure 4.1 we present the results of a meta analysis of studies which treat schooling 
as endogenous, based on the PURE dataset of results used earlier.  Compared to an average 
from OLS of 6.5% we see much larger returns to schooling in IV studies generally (of about 
9%) and from IV studies based on education reforms in particular (of around 13 to 14%).   In 
contrast, IV studies that use family background as instruments have returns on average close 
to the OLS estimate. In the few examples where the legitimacy of family background 
variables as instruments has been tested, they have been shown to be weak (Rischall, 1999). 
Figure 4.1 Meta-Analysis of Models with Endogenous Schooling 
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Table 4.3 outlines the key results in this literature for the non-UK studies.  Angrist 
and Krueger (1991) use the presence of compulsory schooling law variation across US states 
and the quarter of the year in which a person was born as the basis of their instruments. The 
underlying idea here is that a person who has been born early in the year (the first quarter) 
reaches the minimum school leaving age after a smaller amount of schooling than persons 
born later in the year.  The actual amount of schooling attained is directly related to the 
quarter in which they were born while at the same time there seems no reason to believe that 
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quarter of birth has an own independent effect on earnings.  Direct estimation by OLS gives 
an estimate of the return to schooling of 0.063 whereas the IV method gives an estimate of 
0.08121.   
Table 4.3 IV Studies – International 
Study Sample OLS 
% 
IV 
% 
Instruments 
Angrist and Krueger  
(1991) 
US 1970/1980 Census: Men born 
1920-29, 1930-39, 1940-49 
7.0 
(0.000) 
10.1 
(0.033) 
Year * Quarter of Birth; 
State * Quarter of Birth 
Angrist and Krueger 
(1992) 
US 1979-85 CPS:  Men born 1944-
53 (hence potential Vietnam War 
draftees). 
5.9 
(0.001) 
6.6 
(0.015) 
Draft Lottery Number * 
Year of Birth 
Card (1995) US NLS: Men aged 14-24 in 1966 
sampled as employed in 1976. 
7.3 
(0.004) 
13.2 
(0.049) 
Nearby college in 
county of residence in 
1966.   
Butcher and Case 
(1994) 
US PSID 1985: White women 
aged 24+ 
9.1 
(0.007) 
18.5 
(0.113) 
Presence of siblings 
(sisters) 
Uusitalo (1996) Finnish Defence Forces Basic 
Ability Test Data matched to 
Finnish income tax registers. 
8.9 
(0.006) 
12.9 
(0.018) 
Parental income and 
education, location of 
residence. 
Meghir and Palme 
(1999) 
Sweden – Males 2.8 
(0.007) 
3.6 
(0.021) 
Swedish curriculum 
reforms. 
Duflo (1999) Indonesian – Males 7.7 
(.001) 
9.1 
(0.023) 
Indonesian school 
reforms – school 
building project. 
Denny and Harmon 
(2000) 
ESRI 1987 Data – Males 
 
8.0 
(0.006) 
13.6 
(0.025) 
Irish school reforms – 
abolition of fees for 
secondary schooling. 
Note : Standard Errors in parentheses 
  
 
21  The study of Angrist and Krueger has been criticized by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995). They argue that 
quarter of birth may have an impact on earnings other than only through the effect on schooling. Studies from 
other social sciences indicate that the timing of births over a year is related to social background. Parents with 
lower social backgrounds tend to get children spread evenly over the year, while parents from higher social 
classes get children during more concentrated in particular seasons. 
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 In another study, Angrist and Krueger (1992) exploit the idea that because college 
enrolment led to draft exemptions potential draftees for the Vietnam campaign had this 
exogenous influence on their schooling decision. The instruments are based around numbers 
assigned on the basis of month and day of birth from which a ‘draft lottery’ was conducted. 
Again the IV results are higher than OLS but the difference is insignificant, perhaps 
reflecting later work that suggested the instrument was only marginally significant to the 
education decision (see Bound et al. (1995)).  Card (1995) uses an indicator for the distance 
to college as an instrument for schooling based on the observed higher education levels of 
men who were raised near a four-year college and finds returns of 13.2% compared to OLS 
estimates of closer to 7%.  However again the estimates were rather imprecise.   Butcher and 
Case (1994), in one of the few examples based on a sample of women, again find IV 
exceeding OLS and in fact the estimated return more than doubles in this study.   
Uusitalo (1996) uses the fact that all eligible Finnish males must complete military 
service, where aptitude tests are undertaken. By matching this data to tax and census registers 
this study estimates earnings equations for males based on instruments constructed to indicate 
parental background variables and the location of residence. The findings again suggest an 
increase in IV over OLS of some 100%, again statistically significant.  A somewhat different 
approach is used in the paper by Esther Duflo (1999) where estimation is based on the 
exposure of individuals to a massive investment program in education in Indonesia in the 
early 1970’s.  Individuals were assigned to the treatment on the basis of their date of birth 
(pre and post reform) and the district they lived in (as investment was a function of local level 
needs assessment). Meghir and Palme (1999) pursue a similar strategy in their analysis of 
reforms in Sweden in the 1950’s that were intended to extend the schooling level nationally.   
This was piloted in a number of school districts prior to its adoption nationally and it is from 
this pre-trial experiment that the variation in attainment comes. Both these papers rely on 
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large-scale reforms, which can be thought of as "natural experiments" since their effect 
differed across individuals.  A similar approach is used in Denny and Harmon (2000b) in 
looking at a fundamental change in the educational system in 1960's Ireland which affected 
the entire population of school-age individuals in a way which differed across socio-
economic backgrounds.  
There are a small number of examples in the UK literature using this approach 
summarised in Table 4.4.  Dearden (1995, 1998) repeats the idea in Butcher and Case (1994) 
by using sibling presence as an instrument for schooling. This study employed National Child 
Development Study (NCDS) data from the United Kingdom and found increased estimates of 
the return to schooling compared to the OLS equivalents.   In a series of papers Harmon and 
Walker (1995, 1999, 2000) use changes in the compulsory school leaving age laws in the 
1950’s and 1970’s as instruments, as well as other educational reforms (such as the Robbin’s 
Act) and peer effects.  Across a number of datasets a robust finding emerges that compared to 
OLS estimates of the order of 5-7% per year of schooling, the IV estimated returns were 
significantly higher.  
Table 4.4 IV Studies - UK 
 Data OLS IV Instruments 
Dearden (1998) UK NCDS: Men 4.8% 
(0.004) 
5.5% 
(0.005) 
Family composition, parental 
education, social class. 
Harmon and 
Walker (1995) 
UK FES 78-86. 
Males 16-64. 
6.1% 
(0.001) 
15.2% 
(0.015) 
School leaving age changes. 
Harmon and 
Walker (1999) 
UK GHS 92.   
Males 16-64. 
4.9% 
(0.000) 
14.0% 
(0.005) 
School leaving age changes 
and educational reforms. 
Harmon and 
Walker (2000) 
UK NCDS:  Men 5.0% 
(0.005) 
9.9% 
(0.019) 
Measures of peer effects and 
education system level 
effect.   
 
The differences between IV and OLS here are clearly large, and support the 
international evidence that we have. While these results concur with the simple Wald 
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estimates earlier it is, nevertheless, important that this difference is subjected to more detailed 
examination.  In Table 4.5 we report the results from a number of datasets and specifications 
that use smoking status as an instrument.  The rationale for using smoking as an instrument is 
given in Evans and Montgomery (1997) where it is argued that smoking is indicative of 
strong particular time preference: that is, high discount rates so that individuals who smoke 
show that they place considerable weight on satisfying current wants at the expense of the 
future. Smoking at age 16 is not correlated with current earnings22 but is correlated with 
educational choices.  In the table we see larger estimated returns from the IV estimations than 
the OLS results.   
Table 4.5 Further IV Results – Smoking as an Instrument 
 Men Women 
Data and instruments Estimated 
returns 
N Estimated 
returns 
N 
GHS: OLS 0.064 (0.002) 14424 0.092  (0.002) 11759 
GHS: Current Smoking 0.205 (0.012) 14424 0.163 (0.011) 11759 
GHS: Smoking at  14/16/18 0.095 (0.007) 17907 0.126 (0.008) 17047 
BHPS: OLS 0.064 (0.002) 8284 0.103 (0.002) 8987 
BHPS: Current smoking 0.209 (0.014) 8284 0.168 (0.011) 8987 
NCDS: OLS (with family controls) 0.061 (0.006) 3169 0.107 (0.007) 1981 
NCDS: Current smoking  (with family controls) 0.191 (0.031) 2311 0.215 (0.043) 1978 
NCDS: Smoked at 16 (with family controls) 0.080 (0.033) 1972 0.207 (0.032) 1692 
NCDS: OLS (no family controls) 0.075 (0.005) 3169 0.120 (0.006) 2319 
NCDS: Current smoking (no family controls) 0.203 (0.029) 3161 0.241 (0.030) 2736 
NCDS: Smoked at 16 (no family controls) 0.084 (0.030) 2486 0.219 (0.025) 2150 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. The models include year dummies, marital status, and 
the number of children in three age ranges, region dummies, and regional unemployment rates. Numbers of 
observations differ because of missing values for some variables. 
 
The element of this work that seems most noticeable is the often very large returns 
obtained when current smoking is used (estimates of around 20%) compared with the more 
modest increases when smoking at 16 is used (estimates of around 8% for men, although 
 
22   Because of income effects current smoking and current income are likely to be correlated invalidating this as 
a choice of variable. 
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larger for women).   For the reasons already mentioned there may be some violation of the 
strict rules for the validity of the instrument when using current smoking in that some 
correlation with current earnings is quite likely.    
4.3 Why are the IV Estimates Higher than OLS? 
 As discussed above Card (1995) presents a model of endogenous schooling, which 
shows that individuals invest in schooling until the marginal return to schooling is equal to 
their marginal discount rate.  Therefore less educated workers have either lower returns to 
schooling (i.e. they are less able) or higher discount rates (i.e. they have less taste for 
education or poorer backgrounds).  If an intervention used as an instrument in an IV 
estimation induces those from the low-education group to participate further then the 
associated return will reflect the marginal returns for the low-education group, which may 
well exceed the return for the population as a whole.   Similar research by Lang (1993) also 
considers this issue of heterogeneous returns, sometimes labeled ‘discount rate bias’.  
 In the Card (2000) model the return to education is allowed to vary across the 
population, and the marginal return to schooling is a decreasing function of schooling.  When 
the instrument is formed on the basis of membership of a treatment group the IV estimate of 
the return to schooling is the difference in expected log earnings between the control group 
and the treatment group, divided by the difference in expected schooling for the two groups.  
This implies that if all individuals in the population have the same marginal return the IV 
estimate is a consistent estimate of the average marginal rate of return.  However, if the return 
to schooling is allowed to vary across individuals the IV estimate is the rate of return for the 
subgroup most affected by the treatment/instrument.  If only one subgroup is affected by the 
intervention the IV estimator will yield the marginal rate of return for that subgroup.   
 In this respect the IV estimator can exceed the conventional OLS estimator if the 
intervention affects a subgroup with relatively high marginal return to schooling.   In the 
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context of Card’s model this is possible as low amounts of schooling can imply higher 
marginal returns to schooling if the relative variation in ability is small.  If the intervention 
affects those with below-average schooling levels the IV estimate will be larger than the 
‘average’ OLS result.  This is suggested as a rationale for the results in, for example, Angrist 
and Krueger (1991, 1992) concerning changes in compulsory schooling laws, and is a 
specific example of the more general issue of estimating returns for the marginal groups hit 
by the treatment known as Local Average Treatment Effects (or LATE23).   
 Moreover, as noted by Dearden (1995) if our instrument(s) is correlated with the true 
measure of education but uncorrelated with the measurement error in schooling the IV 
approach can be used, and the presence of measurement error should not affect the estimated 
IV return to education which will be consistent.  What will differ is the interpretation placed 
on the difference between OLS and IV results.  As such the difference can now be attributed 
to a combined effect of measurement error and the endogeneity of schooling.  The research 
by Ashenfelter and Krueger (1995) calculates the reliability ratio (the ratio of variance of the 
measurement error to total variance in S) in years of schooling measures in survey data at 
90%, suggesting that approximately 10% of the total variance in schooling is due to 
measurement error.   Moreover Uusitalo (1999) uses information on schooling from register 
data that is updated directly from school, so the degree of measurement error is almost 
certainly much smaller.  Despite this both studies find in favour of large and significant 
downward bias in least squares estimates.   On this evidence measurement error appears an 
unlikely candidate for explaining the IV/OLS difference.   
 
23   There are two arguments in the LATE literature – either unobserved heterogeneity in returns, or higher 
returns for specific groups such as the disadvantaged for example. 
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 Finally, the negative correlation may be a result of optimizing behaviour of 
individuals.  Assuming another unmeasured factor that affects income but is unrelated to 
ability is the approach of Griliches (1977) and Blackburn and Neumark (1995).  For example 
if there is a component that affects the marginal costs of education but not the marginal 
benefits, such as foregone earnings, the optimizing framework will lead to a negative 
correlation between schooling and the earnings function residual. 
4.4 Instrument Relevance and Instrument Validity 
 Bound et al. (1995) urges caution in the use of IV.  IV can be thought of as a way of 
splitting the variance in schooling into an endogenous component and an exogenous 
component. This is done by including a variable (or variables) into an equation to explain 
schooling decisions which is (are) not in the wage equation. The essence of their argument is 
that the consistency of IV assumes such instrumental variables are correlated with the 
schooling decisions of individuals but not with the earnings outcomes for individuals.   So if 
this is not the case, and if there is only a weak relationship between the instrument and 
schooling, then estimation by IV will lead to large inconsistencies.  Thus, a weak relationship 
between schooling and the instruments will raise the problem of inconsistency in the use of 
IV.  In addition, a strong relationship between the instruments and the error in the wage 
equation will also raise the inconsistency problem and this problem will be magnified if the 
instruments are not strongly correlated with S. As an example Bound et al re-estimate the 
results from Angrist and Krueger (1991) and find that the hundreds of instruments used in 
that study are mostly uncorrelated with S which can result in IV being more biased that OLS. 
 A similar argument has been put forward for the case of invalid instruments.  Again 
Bound and Jaeger (1995), based on a replication of the original paper finds that quarter of 
birth does seem to have an effect on wages invalidating the case made in Angrist and Krueger 
(1991).  Family background variables are also likely to come into this category.   
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 Non-random assignment to treatment and control groups can potentially arise in 
natural experiments.  As suggested in Card (1999), in the study by Harmon and Walker 
(1995) people born before 1958 were considered as the control group and those post 1958 
were the treatment on the basis of the implementation of the change in school leaving age.  
However older cohorts may be different in other ways – their education may have been 
affected by World War II for example (see Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2000)). 
 Finally publication bias is suggested by Ashenfelter, Oosterbeek and Harmon (1999).   
The average return to schooling in a meta analysis of schooling returns estimated by OLS is 
6% compared to an average of over 9% from IV estimates.   Ashenfelter et al. estimate the 
probability of being observed in a sample of estimated returns as a declining function of the 
p-value on your result.  In other words more significant results have a higher chance of being 
observed.  When this is corrected for, about two-thirds of the gap between the average OLS 
estimated return and the average IV estimated return can be accounted for. 
4.5 Further Evidence – Fixed Effect Estimators 
Table 4.6 illustrates some recent findings from the literature based on samples of 
siblings or twins.  This approach exploits a belief that siblings are more alike then a randomly 
selected pair of individuals, given that they share common heredity, financial support, peer 
influences, geographic and sociological influences etc.  This literature attempts to eliminate 
omitted ability bias by estimating the return to schooling from differences between siblings or 
twins in levels of schooling and earnings, based on a belief that these differences represent 
differences in innate ability or motivation, a truer picture of ability bias then simple test 
scores.  This approach received much attention in the schooling-earnings literature in the late 
seventies and early eighties, possibly as a result of the availability of suitable panel data or 
specialist studies like the Kalamazoo project.  If the omitted variable, say ability (A), is such 
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that siblings have the same level of A, then any estimate of β from within family data, i.e., 
differences in salary between brothers, will eliminate this bias.   
Table 4.6 Twins/Siblings Research on Schooling Returns 
Author Data OLS IV 
Ashenfelter and Rouse (1999) Princeton Twins Survey 7.8% 10% 
Rouse (1997) Princeton Twins Survey 7.5% 11% 
Miller et al (1995) Australian Twins Register 4.5% 7.4% 
Isaccson (1999) Swedish same sex twins 4% 5.4% 
Ashenfelter and Zimmermann (1997) NLS Young Men 4.9% 10% 
Bonjour, Haskel and Hawkes (2000) St Thomas’ Twins 
Research Unit girls 
6.2% 7.2% 
 
The survey by Griliches (1979) concludes that the estimated return to schooling, 
where ability bias is purged via differencing within twin pairs, is lower that the estimated 
return from the whole sample.   The research of Blanchflower and Elias (1999) argues that 
twins may represent a quite distinct population grouping, making generalizations to the 
population as a whole difficult.  Moreover Jaeger and Solon (1999) point out that the US 
twins data seems to have larger differences in S that randomly matched unrelated individuals 
would have, casting doubt on the data.  However more fundamental criticisms of this 
approach have focused on the underlying assumptions.  If ability has an individual component 
as well as a family component, which is not independent of the schooling variable, the within-
family approach may not yield estimates that are any less biased.  Also, although more 
desirable than the approach of ability 'proxies' outlined above the problem of poorly specified 
data may be particularly damaging to this more sophisticated approach, particularly if the 
measurement of schooling is prone to error both in the choice of measure and the reporting of 
the data, even in cross-sectional studies.  If schooling is measured with error this will account 
for a larger fraction of the differences between the twins than across the population as a 
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whole.  This would imply that the bias from measurement error in schooling is likely to 
increase by forming differences between twins.      
 Recent contributions to the twins literature have attempted to deal with the 
measurement error problem by instrumenting the education of twin A using the measure of 
the education of Twin A as reported by Twin B.   Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) collected 
data at an annual twins festival in 1991, and find against the conventional result of upward 
bias in OLS estimates.   Moreover, correcting for measurement error in the self-reported 
schooling level generates a much larger estimate of the schooling return, in the order of 12-
16%.   The possible non-randomness of this dataset and the relatively small samples used led 
to criticisms.   However the findings of Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1992) support this 
result.  The work of Martin et al. (1994), which uses a much larger sample of twins, from an 
Australian representative survey, and employs the same technique as Ashenfelter and 
Krueger (1994), also finds strong evidence of downward bias in the least squares estimates.   
The only UK study is by Bonjour et al (2000) and is for a sample of women participating in a 
health panel.  
 The major weakness of all of these studies is that little or no attention has been given 
to why twins have different levels of education. The literature assumes that within-twins 
differences in education is randomly distributed and it is not obvious that this is the case. If it 
is not the case then the twins literature faces precisely the same endogeneity problem that has 
plagued the rest of the literature. 
 Other panel data techniques have been employed to address this problem.  By treating 
the unobserved heterogeneity as a fixed effect, individual panel data can be used to eliminate 
it. It is assumed that the unobservables are time invariant, and hence observations on the 
same individual at different time periods yield the information necessary to isolate the effect 
of the unobservable.  The applicability of panel data to estimates of schooling returns is 
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limited.  This is due to the nature of the panel that we only observe earnings information 
following completion of schooling.  Taking first differences in earnings will eliminate not 
only the unobservable fixed effect but the schooling information also.  Information is 
therefore required on individuals’ earnings before and after schooling, and as such is only 
available for those who return to education later in their lives.  While this appears unlikely 
Angrist and Newey (1991) find some 19% of working male respondents in the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youths (NLSY, a cohort study conducted in the US which followed 
young people through time) reporting a higher level of schooling in later waves of the data, 
undermining the assumption that schooling can be thought of as a fixed effect24. 
 
24   Moreover the assumption implicit in this procedure is that the returns to years of continuous schooling is the 
same as the return to schooling when resumed after an interruption, which may not be realistic. 
 66
Part B:  Social/Non-Pecuniary Returns to Education 
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5. The Social Returns to Education 
5.1 Externalities from Education 
A clear message of the previous section is that there is a significant private return 
(which just includes the costs and benefits that flow to the student) to education  and the OLS 
estimates can be considered at least a lower bound to the true value of this return.   
As noted in Sianesi and Van Reenen  (1999) and Dutta et al. (1999) persistently high 
returns to individuals undertaking higher education suggests that individuals may be 
underinvesting in education for some reason: for example, there may be some failure in the 
credit market that demands that collateral backing is required to obtain a loan. This collateral 
requirement may well prevent individuals from borrowing against their expected future 
income. Thus, one intervention that may well be necessary is to provide or guarantee 
education loans.  
However, in the absence of such market imperfections, a high private return it not 
itself a reason why taxpayers resources should be invested in encouraging educational 
participation unless there are benefits to society over and above the benefits to the individual.  
Greenaway and Haynes (2000) discuss the possibility that graduates raise the productivity of 
non-graduates such that aggregate productivity is higher.  Moreover there may be social 
cohesion benefits from education participation rates being increased through government 
interventions, such as lower crime – at least some of which may be difficult to insure against 
(insurance against violent crime is not commonly available). It is clearly easier to imagine 
such effects being important at low levels of education but less easy to envisage for higher 
education. 
 Dutta, Sefton and Weale (1999) calculate social rates by comparing the earnings 
profiles for male university graduates and non-graduates who have A-levels and using a 
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baseline assumption for the cost of producing a graduate of £4,790 per annum plus earnings 
foregone while studying25.   Social rates of return for three groupings of degree subjects are 
then estimated.   These rates of return for graduates range from zero (for broadly humanities 
and biological sciences) to over 11 per cent (for medicine, other science and computing, 
business studies and social studies).  These are lower than their private rate of return 
estimates.  Evidence in OECD (1998) cited in Greenaway and Haynes (2000) suggests that 
social rates of return in the OECD are around 10 per cent, and higher in countries where 
students make a contribution to costs (such as Australia, Canada and the US).  However, this 
analysis makes no allowance for wider benefits to the economy.  
5.2 Human Capital and Growth – Macroeconomic Evidence 
Aggregating a Mincer human capital earnings function (HCEF) to the economy level we get 
jtjtjtjt eSrw +=ln , where jtw and jtS  are the mean wage (in practice, GDP per capita is 
used) and schooling respectively in country j at time t.  Differencing removes technological 
differences that are part of the error term terms to give jtjjtjtjj eSrSrw Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ ln , so the 
S coefficient shows how returns have changed over time, while the ΔS coefficient gives the 
(social) rate of return in j at time t.  Psacharopolous (1994) found that the Mincerian (private) 
return fell on average by 1.7% over 12 years from the mid 1970’s across a wide range of 
OECD countries, while O’Neill (1995) found that the (social) return rose by 58% in 
developed countries and 64% in LDCs between 1967 and 1985.  The implication is that the 
externality has been growing over time. 
 
25   Earnings foregone is calculated as the average earnings of A-level workers less approximate earnings while 
studying of £1,000 per annum.   
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 The idea that growth rates should converge is in a feature of many macro-studies – 
those below their steady-state growth rate should catch up with those above. That is 
( ) jjjtj uWWW +−=Δ − *1β  where W = log of w and W* is the steady state level of GDP (per 
capita). Then the macro growth equation would become jtjjtj erSWW +++=Δ −− ......1,1β  where 
variables such as “rule-of-law” index, inflation, and capital are sometimes included.  In 
addition an interaction  may be included to capture the idea that the speed of 
convergence may be faster the higher is the level of education. 
1,1 −− tjSjtW
 Such growth equations are usually estimated from pooled cross-section data spanning 
5 (or more) years. Classic examples are Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), Barro and Lee 
(1993) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994).  However there are some differences between what 
is usually estimated in the growth modelling literature and micro work in the Mincer 
tradition.   Much of the macro-growth literature excludes ΔS, the change in schooling levels 
in the economy.  The growth literature also typically includes controls to capture the steady 
state level of GDP – including the  term.   1−jtS
 There are a number of empirical difficulties with this literature mainly related to the 
nature of the causal relationship between schooling and growth.  The interpretation of the S 
coefficient in jtjjtj erSWW +++=Δ −− ......1,1β  could be interpreted as a return in terms of the 
‘steady state’ growth of the economy - educated countries grow faster.  However more 
indirect effects are possible.  Schooling may better enable the workforce to develop and adapt 
to new technologies that will also allow educated countries to grow faster.  But paradoxically 
countries with low levels of average schooling might have better opportunities to grow by 
adopting technology developed abroad.   The return to S may have risen or fallen which 
can jeopardize the interpretation in these growth models.  However anticipated growth in an 
economy could cause an increase in the demand for education.  Indeed Topel (2000) has 
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argued that “little can be learned” from macro growth equations because either a positive or a 
negative coefficient on human capital is “consistent with the idea that human capital is a boon 
to growth and development”. 
 
5.3 Human Capital and Growth – Microeconomic Evidence 
Krueger and Lindahl (1999) strongly criticise many of the macro contributions in this 
area and point to the micro foundations of the analysis and the strong assumptions 
underpinning the findings.  For example many of the more general results linking education 
and growth might stem from imposing constant-coefficient and linearity restrictions on the 
data.  This point is reaffirmed in Trostel (2000) who shows how the limited microeconomic 
evidence on human capital production is not helpful as it imposes important restrictions on 
the estimates of the returns to scale to the inputs.  Although constant returns may be an 
appropriate assumption for some educational services (i.e., teaching) this does not imply 
constant returns to scale in producing human capital, which is embodied in individuals.  In 
Trostel’s model the returns to scale is inferred from the rate of return to education.  Data from 
the International Social Survey Programme is used to estimate (private) rates of return to 
education and rejects a constant marginal rate of return to education, which is shown to 
equate to a rejection of constant returns to scale in producing human capital.  The marginal 
rate of return to schooling is shown to be significantly increasing at low levels of education 
indicating significant increasing returns, and the marginal rate of return decreases 
significantly at high levels education (thus indicating significant decreasing returns). 
 Krueger and Lindahl (1999) also stress how causality can be confused – it is not clear 
that cross-country differences in education are a cause of income, or a result of income or 
income growth.  Therefore, while considerable effort has been placed in the exogeneity or 
endogeneity of schooling in private returns estimation based on microeconomic data, little or 
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no effort has been made in the possible endogeneity of education in cross-country macro 
specifications.   Similarly human capital enhancement projects can result in other investments 
to enhance growth introducing a second source of omitted variable bias in cross-country 
study.  The call in the Krueger and Lindahl research is for an experimental approach to be 
adopted in the social returns literature to repeat, in essence, what we extensively discussed 
earlier in the report for the estimation of private returns.  In view of the difficulty in finding a 
‘one size fits all’ experiment the conjecture in this research is that establishing the social 
returns and quantifying the likely externalities from education is likely to be more successful 
from within region study rather than between country study.   
 A literature is beginning in this vein but unfortunately the evidence is already 
conflicting.  Moretti (1999a) examines US census information for otherwise similar workers 
within cities with higher and lower education levels.  He differences out the potential 
attraction of the city for particular workers as well as the endogeneity of the growth in 
education across cities.  What is found is that a 1% increase in the share of college educated 
workers raises the earnings of school dropouts by 2.2%, of high school graduates by 1.3% 
and college graduates by 1.1%.   All gains are net of costs.   In this paper Moretti instruments 
for average schooling with changes in the city age structure, the costs of schooling and 
presence of low cost or free post-high school college.  Individual schooling is however left as 
exogenous.  In a later paper (Moretti, 1999b) the human capital externality is found to be 
greatest in human-capital-intensive production.   Plants situated in cities with higher than 
average education levels have higher investment in computers and new machinery.   
Investment in computers in-plant is also found to be associated with usage outside the plant. 
 Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) consider implications of, like Moretti (1999a), treating 
average schooling as endogenous.  However they also allow for the endogeneity of individual 
schooling.  In their econometric specification they show that if the OLS and IV estimates of 
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the private return to schooling differ only instrumenting average schooling can raise  
considerable specification problems.  They use compulsory schooling laws in the US to 
instrument individual schooling and they instrument the average level of schooling in each 
state using the differences in child labour laws across states.  Compared to least square 
estimates of the private return to education of around 6% estimates based on IV range from 
7% to just over 9%.   However the social returns estimated in this paper are smaller at around 
2% per year of average schooling.  Acemoglu and Angrist conclude that their study offers 
little evidence for sizeable social returns to education, at least over the range of variation in 
average statewide education induced by changing the compulsory schooling laws. 
5.4 Other Externalities from Education  
Blundell et al (1999) consider the evidence on the returns to the employer of 
education and training.  The difficulty is well known here – data is hard to obtain which 
measures elements such as productivity, competitiveness and profitability and this in 
confounded by the need to consider the role the employer may take in funding the investment 
in human capital particularly in the case of training.   
 Other more indirect benefits from education may be possible.  Freeman (2000) 
suggest that there is little direct evidence linking education to reductions in crime and the 
perceived linkage relates to the effect that education has on factors such as unemployment 
and inequality.  For example upward trends in inequality are associated with higher levels of 
both property and violent crime (see Kelly, (2000)).  Winter-Ebmer and Raphael (1999) find 
positive effects of unemployment on crime that are not just statistically significant but large 
in size.  Leigh (1998), in a review of work published in this area, concludes that increased 
education is positively and strongly correlated with absence of violent crime, measures of 
health, family stability and environmental benefits. 
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 Lochner (1999) develops and estimates a model of the decisions to work, to educate 
yourself, and to commit crime and allows for the possibility of all of these choices being 
endogenous.  The model suggests that education is correlated with crimes that require less 
skill.  Part of the model allows for simulation of the effects of education subsidies on external 
outcomes and predicts that education subsidies reduce crime.   In so far as possible, empirical 
implications were explored using various large scale US micro datasets.  Ability and high 
school graduation significantly reduce the participation of young men in crime and the 
probability of incarceration.  Evidence from the census data supports a general finding that 
states with higher rates of high school participation and tougher penalties have the lowest 
index for property crime.   
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6. Non-Pecuniary Returns to Education 
Despite the re-emergence, in recent years, of job satisfaction as a topic for analysis in 
economics, there has been little research that looks in detail at the relationship between job 
satisfaction and education. Most papers, when looking at British data, find that the more 
educated are less satisfied with their job. However, Blanchflower and Oswald (1999) find 
that job satisfaction is actually increasing with education, thought they do not control for the 
wage. The results are not so clear-cut for U.S. data.  
This section26 discusses some of these results, and presents new results that 
corroborate this evidence using the 1998 wave of the British Household Panel Survey. Here, 
we are interested in the relationship between education and job satisfaction, not wages and 
job satisfaction, as has been the case for the majority of job satisfaction studies. Hence we 
will not be discussing the importance of relative wages, exogeneity assumptions, etc. 
There are only a few studies that explicitly look at job satisfaction and education. 
Tsang et al. (1991) derive a measure of the required education for each individual’s job, and 
use this to obtain a measure of surplus schooling (actual schooling minus required schooling). 
Their results show that required education is positively related to schooling, and surplus 
schooling is negatively related to job satisfaction. Battu et al. (1999), in a similar study, look 
at how job mismatch is related to job satisfaction. Their measure of mismatch is based on the 
response to a question that asks UK university graduates whether their qualification a 
requirement for the job specification. Not surprisingly, they find a negative relationship 
between the extent of the mismatch and job satisfaction. Assuming that the individual’s level 
 
26 This section draws on research by Arnaud Chevalier and Reamonn Lydon and we are grateful to them for 
their assistance. 
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and type of education affect the quality of the job match, one would expect to find that job 
satisfaction is related to education. Hersch (1991) has analysed the same relationship between 
education, mismatch and job satisfaction and finds similar results.  
 Table 6.1 below presents results that attempt to explain the variation in levels of job 
satisfaction across individuals. The dependent variable is a discrete increasing scale of 
satisfaction and included in the independent variables are controls for a postgraduate degree, 
an undergraduate degree, A-levels, O-levels, apprenticeships and no qualifications. These are 
the highest educational attainments as reported by the respondent. This is essentially the same 
estimation as in Clark and Oswald (1996), though we include controls for the number of 
periods unemployed and the number of weeks unemployed. As we expect, the effect on job 
satisfaction of being more highly educated is negative and (almost) monotonically increasing. 
The negative correlation between education and job satisfaction continues to hold, even when 
we control for wages. The fact that more highly educated people are less satisfied may seem 
counter intuitive, but is supported by the idea of job mismatch and may also arise if there is 
an ‘aspirations’ effect. That is, more educated people have higher expectations from their 
jobs and these aspirations fail to be realised. Note, that when the same estimation was done 
using satisfaction-with-pay as the dependent variable, the results were essentially the same, 
but when the wage was dropped from the estimation the negative correlation disappeared. 
 In order to get some idea of the size of the education effect on job satisfaction we 
create a ‘baseline’ person close to the means/medians in the sample: male, no periods of 
unemployment, 0.8 weeks unemployed, 3.42 log weekly hours, aged 37, lives in the South 
East, works in a clerical/secretarial occupation, has excellent health, does not get a bonus, and 
is not a member of a union. We obtain the predicted probabilities from the estimated model, 
comparing the results when we hold all variables constant at their baseline values, changing 
only the level of education. The results are shown in Table 6.2, and show  that moving from 
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the lowest to the highest level of education on the scale, reduced the probability of being 
satisfied with the job by 15%. 
Table 6. 1   Job Satisfaction Equation 
 
Note: Figures in bold are significant at the 5% level. Controls for industry, occupation, union 
membership, health, region and age are also included. The omitted category is no qualifications. 
Dependent Variable = Job Satisfaction Coefficient Std. Error 
Log Gross Monthly Wage 0.057 0.040 
Postgraduate Degree -0.358 0.106 
Undergraduate Degree -0.256 0.058 
A-Level Only -0.334 0.064 
O-Level Only -0.161 0.057 
Apprentice/Other Qualification -0.099 0.073 
1 U/e Spell in Year to 01.09.98 0.282 0.109 
2 U/e Spells in Year to 01.09.98 0.288 0.305 
3 U/e Spells in Year to 01.09.98 -0.135 0.371 
Number of Weeks U/e in year to 01.09.98 -0.008 0.005 
Log Weekly Hours -0.264 0.053 
Male -0.163 0.036 
Log Likelihood -7865.9 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.026 
Observations 5,385 
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Table 6.2 Change in the Probability of Being ‘Satisfied’ according to education: 
Education Pr(Satisfied) 
Postgraduate degree 0.450 
Undergraduate degree 0.495 
A-level 0.461 
O-level 0.530 
Apprentice 0.557 
No Qualifications 0.595 
 
The results suggest small and statistically insignificant effect of wages on job 
satisfaction that seems implausible and implies that the monetary increment to compensate 
for an increase in education is extremely high and positive such that the net returns to 
education is negative allowing for its effect on job satisfaction. Table 6.3 translates the 
estimated coefficients into probabilities of being job satisfied. Note that degree graduates 
have higher job satisfaction than individuals whose highest qualification is A-levels, although 
apart from this higher levels of education are associated with lower satisfaction. The 
methodology is typical of the literature and relies on education being randomly assigned and 
this seems implausible in this context. Further research is clearly required. 
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Part C: Schooling Decisions 
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7. Early School Leaving and Household Backgrounds 
7.1 Does Early Leaving Matter? 
Considerable evidence exists that suggests that the impact of early school leaving can 
be significant, particularly in the knock-on effects for the family of those individuals who 
leave education at an early age.  Early school leaving seems likely to be an important part of 
the transmission mechanism that induces the strong observed intergenerational correlation of 
incomes and poverty between successive generations.  For example, O’Neill and Sweetman 
(1998) provide direct evidence that parental background is an important determinant of a 
child's future welfare. A son whose father was unemployed twenty years earlier is almost 
twice as likely to be unemployed as a son whose father was not unemployed. This 
dependency remains significant after controlling for a range of son's characteristics including 
education, ability and family composition.   Dearden, Machin and Reed (1997) report a clear 
intergenerational correlation between fathers and both sons and daughters in terms of labour 
market earnings and years of schooling based on analysis of the NCDS cohort. 
 There is also considerable evidence linking child poverty to parental education 
attainment.  For example Kesselman (1994) examines changes in Canadian tax law for the 
treatment of children and illustrates how the alternatives to direct income transfers for 
tackling child poverty should include methods to enhance the employability of poor parents 
through education.  The effectiveness of enhanced income transfers is questioned, as they 
seem to have less impact on the lifetime prospects of poor children.    
 Financial returns to education are clearly significant.  Yet modelling the choice of 
individuals to pursue schooling explicitly taking account of these returns is not common.   
Recently Cameron and Heckman (1998) used the US NLSY panel and found weak current 
parental income effects while strong parental wealth effects in schooling choices.  For the UK 
Micklewright (1989) showed that the proportion of sixteen-year olds in Britain who stay on at 
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school is low by OECD standards and based on the NCDS cohort examined the probability of 
completing education at the minimum legal age. Family background, in the form of class and 
parental education, is shown to have a large effect even when ability and school type are 
controlled for.  Chevalier and Lanot (2000) attempt to disentangle the effect of family income 
on the child’s educational attainment from other characteristics, which might also affect 
schooling decision such as parental education.  They find that the direct effect of family 
income on child’s schooling attainment is overstated by the raw correlation in the data and 
that a policy that relies on increasing parental incomes to increase post-compulsory education 
is unlikely to be effective, and would be expensive. 
 One difficulty with this work is that parental income in NCDS data is available as 
categorical data and the variable contains many missing values. Moreover, the income data is 
simply income and not income contingent on attending school and hence the existing 
literature does not pick up the substitution effect associated with Educational Maintenance 
Allowances (EMAs) through the reduction in the opportunity cost of staying on at school. 
While there has been no evaluation of the EMA pilots to date, below we exploit the 
correlation between education and schooling-contingent parental income. There are two 
sources of such income: child support from absent parents and Child Benefit. 
7.2 Evidence from the Family Resources Survey 
Our work is based on Family Resources Survey (FRS) pooled for 1994, 95, 96 and 97. We 
drop over 18’s because the data is censored by leaving home – only post 18 children in 
HE/FE are recorded as external children, those that leave home but do not go to HE/FE 
disappear from the data, so we confine our attention to staying on at 16. The pooled data 
contains 4416 households with 16-18 year old children. The raw data for sons’ shows:  strong 
social class effects – nonmanual sons have a staying on rate which is 30% higher than manual 
sons; strong regional effects – the North and Midlands staying on rates are about 10% lower 
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than the South; strong effects of father’s education at low levels – if the father left school at 
18 rather than 15 this adds about 30% to staying on rate; strong effects of current income – 
staying on rises across deciles of the parental income distribution at about 3% per decile.  
The data contains information on the Council Tax band of the house - for renters this 
picks up area effects that might reflect peer group influences; while for owner occupiers the 
CT band picks up both this effect and an effect of wealth so we can net out the area effect by 
looking at the effect of the CT band on the children of owner occupiers minus the effect of 
CT band on the children of renters. The idea here is that CT band for owner occupiers picks 
up both area and wealth effects since higher housing value is associated with high housing 
equity. We find weak wealth effects and strong area effects on staying on rates in the raw 
data for sons. 
The data for daughters shows: weak social class effects  – nonmanual daughters have 
a staying on rate which is about 15% points higher than that for manual daughters; strong 
regional effects – the North and Midlands are about 10% lower than the South; some effect of 
father’s education at low levels – father leaving at 18 rather than 15 adds about 20% to the 
staying on rate; some effect of current parental income –staying on rises at about 2% per 
decile of the income distribution; weak area (peer group) effects; and weak wealth effects. 
7.3 Modelling Difficulties 
Parental income and parental education (and other variables) are correlated  – so we 
cannot make inferences about the effect of either without controlling for both, Thus we need 
to model both (all) effects simultaneously. Moreover, unobservable effects are also likely to 
be correlated with income – for example, parental income may be directly correlated with 
both school leaving and with the provision of a good home working environment that may 
also be reflected in later school leaving. Thus, we cannot make inferences about the effects of 
income without controlling for unobservable factors that affect school leaving. Thus, we need 
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to use multivariate methods and we need to instrument parental income to allow for the 
correlation with unobservables that affect child education27. 
The role of current income in this model is to pick up “credit market constraints”, 
while the role of wealth is to pick up long run effects of being brought up in a richer 
environment. There would be a case for policy to reduce child poverty if wealth were 
significant. Schooling contingent income is likely to have a more powerful effect than other 
forms of income since it affects the opportunity cost of staying on. There would be a case for 
EMAs if this were significant.  
Thus, below we present estimates of the probability of early school leaving in the 
FRS microdata containing explanatory variables such as:  parental incomes; parental 
education; family and individual characteristics such as siblings, gender, race, and region; 
wealth (proxied by an interaction variable between council tax band and owner occupier); 
area affects (proxied by council tax band for renters); other characteristics (employment 
status, working mother); and, finally, child support and child benefit. 
In order to overcome the potential endogeneity of parental income we replace 
incomes by predicted incomes which depends on: education, work experience, etc. and on 
two possible instrumental variables:  a variable that captures the effect of the 1974 increase 
in the minimum school leaving age, and union membership. The predicted income variable 
then picks up the effect of exogenous differences in income across individuals. The 
 
27  In general, there appears to be a strong correlation between low income and bad child outcomes and this may 
motivate child poverty policy. However, there is almost no evidence that giving poor parents more money 
makes for better children – poor parents may simply be more likely to be poor at parenting, or they may not be 
skilled at spending money well on behalf of their children (or may spend it on themselves). The paucity of 
evidence indicating that parental income has a causal effect on child outcomes motivates direct interventions 
like SureStart. 
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maintained hypothesis in the methodology is that school leaving decisions are uncorrelated 
with parental union status and with whether the parents were born before or after the raising 
of the school leaving age (-15): we assume that these variables only affect parental incomes 
but not the child’s school leaving age. 
We compare three sets of estimates: a model that contains just a minimal set of 
control variables (siblings, gender, race, region, year) as well as the principal economic 
variables of interest: parental incomes (predicted), child support and child benefit. We refer 
to this model as “No controls” below. Secondly we estimate a “Basic controls” model that 
additional controls for parental education and other characteristics (employment status, 
working mother). Finally, we estimate a “Full controls” that also includes: wealth (proxied by 
council tax band * owner occupier interaction), and Area affects (proxied by council tax 
band). The idea of estimating these three models is to see if any effect of parental income on 
school leaving is sufficiently strong to still be present when we include other observable 
variables that may also be correlated with school leaving. 
Since the analysis is based on estimating a model of the probability of leaving school 
at 16 the transform the estimated coefficients into graphs that show the effects of each of the 
variables on an individual who has a (relatively high) probability of leaving school of 50%. 
That is we fix the characteristics of the individual and then choose a value for the error term 
so that the model predicts a probability of early school leaving of 50%. We then compute the 
effect on the probability of changing each variable in turn. For example, Figure 7.1 shows the 
effects of parental income on the school leaving for each of the specifications. The figure 
shows the predicted effect and the 95% confidence interval around that prediction. With no 
controls this (large) increase in income has a large and statistically significant effect – raising 
the probability to over 70%. However, this prediction is not robust to including other controls 
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– for example, with a full set of control variables we find only a small and insignificant effect 
(indicated by the confidence interval bar crossing the horizontal axis). 
Figure 7.1 The Effects of Father's Income - Extra £100 pw (evaluated at 50% probability) 
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 Figure 7.2 shows the effect of an increase in schooling-contingent income. Here we 
simulate the effect of a transfer of  £25 per week.  Again we find that although we can easily 
generate a large effect, the effect becomes smaller and less precisely estimated when 
additional control variables are included. Thus, with full controls the effect of such a change, 
akin to an EMA of realistic magnitude, is just a 3.4% increase in the probability, although 
this figure is estimated with a high standard error.  
Figure 7.2 Schooling contingent income - Extra £25 pw - evaluated at 50% probability 
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Thus our results do not provide robust support for a policy of using EMAs to promote 
later school leaving. However, our estimates depend on variation in schooling contingent 
income in the FRS data and this is essentially a function of household characteristics. Thus, it 
is difficult to untangle the effects of the income from the effects of the characteristics that that 
income depends on. A more comprehensive evaluation of EMAs must await analysis of the 
data generated by pilot schemes around the country. 
 The effect of mother’s education is explored in Figure 7.3, which comes from a 
specification that includes a full set of control variables. We find a strong effect - an 
additional year of education for a mother induces a predicted increase in participation of 
approximately 4% points. 
Figure 7.3 Effect of Mother's Education - evaluated at 50% probability 
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
<15 15 16 17 18+
Age left FT education
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 
The CT band information is used as a crude control for area. For renters this is the 
only effect that this variable would have, while for owner-occupiers it would pick up both 
area and wealth effects. Of course, for both renters and owners CT band could be associated 
with other characteristics such as income or class. However, we control for income and 
education in our analysis and we found no class effects (using socio-economic group) once 
on controls for income and parental education and employment status were included.  Figure 
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7.4 shows that for renters children in E band houses have significantly later school leaving 
than band A children. Figure 7.5 shows the effect for owner-occupiers minus the effect for 
renters and so could, arguably, be thought to have factored out the area effect to leave only 
the effect of wealth. 
Figure 7.4 Area Effects (renters) - Evaluated at 50% probability 
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Figure 7.5 Area Effects (owners minus renters) - Evaluated at 50% probability 
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8. Conclusion 
Despite a well developed theoretical foundation, the estimation of the return to a year 
of schooling has been the focus of considerable debate in the economics literature.  A 
dominant feature of the literature that estimates human capital earnings function, is that 
schooling is exogenous, and this has been the focus of recent research efforts.  With respect 
to the returns from schooling for an individual a number of conclusions can be drawn.   
 The simple analysis of average earnings for different levels of education can mask a 
number of issues.   The omission of additional controls assumes that variables that affect 
wages are uncorrelated with schooling – which seems implausible.  For example older people 
are likely to have lower levels of education but higher levels of work experience giving very 
different ‘returns’ for a given level of schooling.  Multivariate regression analysis based on 
Ordinary Least Square (or OLS) suggests a return to a year of schooling of between 7% and 
9% when a relatively parsimonious specification is used based on controlling for schooling 
and experience (measured with age and its square to capture the potential for diminishing 
returns to experience).   This would appear to be at the upper end of returns to schooling in 
Europe, where Nordic countries in particular have low average returns to schooling.  The 
returns to schooling are relatively stable to changes in this simple OLS specification (such as 
including controls for marital status/family size/union membership) but some differences are 
worth noting.   Using different measures of experience (based on actual reported experience 
and so-called ‘potential’ experience or the difference between current age and the age left 
school) will tend to raise the return to schooling by approximately 1%.  Including 
occupational controls will tend to have the opposite effect, lowering the return by around 1%.   
Basing the estimation on samples of employed persons may also bias the returns to schooling 
downwards, at least for samples of women, but our evidence suggested that this effect, 
although significant, was small. 
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 The basic specification assumes that (log) earnings are linear in education, so that 
each year of education adds the same percentage amount to earnings irrespective of the 
particular year of education.  This may seem implausible but it has been difficult to find 
examples in the literature that conclusively prove that linearity is not a valid assumption.   
There is limited evidence that some years of schooling carry ‘sheepskin’ effect – leaving 
school the year immediately following a credential awarding year for example may generate 
a lower return for that year generating a dip in the education/earning profile.  However, the 
literature has not really addressed the endogeneity of schooling despite the strong 
disincentives to leave school in particular years implied by the results. 
 The returns to education may also differ across the wage distribution.  Evidence based 
on quantile regression methods suggests that the returns are higher for those in the top decile 
of the income distribution compared to those in the bottom decile.  Moreover this inequality 
may have increased in recent years. One explanation for this phenomenon is a 
complementarity between ability and education – if higher ability persons earn more this 
might explain the higher returns in the upper deciles of the wage distribution. 
 This finding has important implications for both education and  tax and social security 
policy: the low return to investing in low ability individuals and the high return to investing 
in high ability individuals implies that educational investment should be skewed towards the 
high ability individuals. The resulting inequality may then be dealt with through 
redistributive tax and social security policy. 
 Given the increase in the supply of educated workers in most OECD countries there is 
a concern that the skills workers bring to their job will exceed the skills required for the job.   
This will manifest itself in a lower return to schooling for the years of schooling in excess of 
those required for the employer.   One of the main problems with this literature is the often 
poor definition of overeducation in available datasets, typically based on subjective measures 
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given by the individual respondent.   Where a more comprehensive definition is used based 
on job satisfaction the apparent negative effect of overeducation is eliminated when ability 
controls are included, but when overeducation appears to be genuine the penalty may be 
much larger than was first thought. 
This has important implications for the variance in the quality of graduates produced 
by the higher education system. Firstly, a degree is not sufficient to ensure a graduate job – 
other complementary skills are expected by graduate employers. Secondly, since genuine 
overeducation can emerge it is clear that the labour market does not adjust fast enough. So a 
degree of manpower planning is required to ensure that particular types of graduate are not 
produced excessively. 
 It is possible that the return to education actually reflects the underlying ability that 
education signals – in other words education is a signal of inherent productivity of the 
individual rather than a means to enhance the productivity.   Estimates presented here of the 
signalling component of the returns suggest that the effect is quite small.  Based on datasets 
where direct measures of ability are available the inclusion of ability measures lowers the 
return to schooling by less than one percentage point.   This can be higher where the ability 
measure is taken at an older age – however caution must be exercised in interpreting these 
results as the ability measure is almost certainly contaminated by the effect of schooling.   
However, consistent with the earlier discussion of the complementarity between education 
and ability evidence from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) suggests that the 
return to schooling is different across the distribution of ability – those in the bottom decile of 
the ability measure have returns to schooling of around 2.5%, substantially lower than the 
average returns of approximately 7%.    
 Ideally the way we would wish to measure the return to schooling would be to 
compare the earnings of an individual with two different levels of schooling, but in practice 
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only one level of education is observed for a particular individual.  The literature has recently 
attempted to deal with this problem by finding ‘experiments’ in the economy that randomly 
assign groups of individuals to different levels of schooling.   We can, for example, examine 
the wages of people who left school at 16 when the minimum school leaving age was raised 
to 16 compared to those that left school at 15 before the change in the minimum age 
legislation.   This gives us a measure of the return to schooling for those that would not have 
chosen an extra year of schooling.  The return to schooling from studies that use this 
methodology seem to be larger than those obtained using OLS.  Alternatively a more 
sophisticated modelling procedure based on Instrumental Variables can be used to deal with 
this problem.    
 The effect of this change in estimation procedure can be considerable.  Average 
returns to schooling from OLS are around 6% internationally but over 9% from these 
alternative methods . The UK appears to be at the higher end of the international range so,  
for the UK, the comparison is between 7 and 9% from OLS to a range of 11% to 15% from 
the IV/experimental methods.   A concern about this methodology is that the higher returns 
found may reflect the return for the particular subgroup affected by the policy intervention.   
Thus, for example, changes in compulsory schooling laws may affect those individuals who 
place the least value on education – and as such estimates of the return to schooling based on 
these changes may be estimating the returns for that group.  In short, care should be taken in 
the interpretation of IV estimated returns to schooling as an indicator of the return to all 
individuals without careful knowledge of the effect of the interventions used in estimation of 
the return. 
An additional concern is that the intervention actually has only a weak effect on 
schooling and that this lack of information in the instrument can introduce or exaggerate bias 
in the estimated returns.   While, in the work presented here the instruments seem to be quite 
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strong, there are many examples in the literature where weak or invalid instruments have 
been used, particularly instruments based on family background. 
 The evidence on private returns to the individual is therefore compelling.  
Despite some of the subtleties involved in estimation there is still an unambiguously positive 
effect on the earnings of an individual from participation in education. Moreover, the size of 
the effect seems large relative to the returns on other investments.  Evidence on the net 
benefits to the economy, taking account of the increased earnings and the cost of providing 
education is limited in the UK, mainly to HE. The available evidence suggests that those net 
benefits are positive, but vary by degree subject with the highest return captured by medicine, 
non-biological sciences, social sciences and computing.  Given the high return to education to 
the individual, unless there are benefits to society (social returns) over and above the private 
returns the argument for the taxpayer to provide extensive subsidies for education seem weak. 
Such benefits might include those with more education raising the productivity of those 
working along side them, and social cohesion benefits. 
Direct macroeconomic evidence that links growth to education in confounded by the 
unclear nature of the causal relationship between average schooling levels and measures such 
as GNP growth.   The microeconomic studies that are available confirm this and show how 
many of the important findings linking education to growth are based on restrictive functional 
form assumptions.   What is needed to solve the issue of this wider impact of education on 
society is a parallel to the experimental approach adopted in the estimation of private returns. 
This suggests that within-country rather than between-country analysis may be the route to 
quantifying the externality from education.    
 The returns to education may be non-pecuniary.  The link between job satisfaction 
and education is not heavily researched.   Evidence presented here based on the BHPS data 
suggest that contrary to prior assumptions education may be negatively associated with job 
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satisfaction due to the high aspirations that well-educated individuals may have for their 
careers. However this issue requires more attention than it has been given in the past. 
 Finally we present evidence on the effect of family background on education 
decisions.   There is considerable evidence suggesting that early school leaving is an 
important part of the transmission mechanism for poverty in successive generations.  By 
exploiting the correlation between education and schooling-contingent parental income (child 
support from absent parents and Child Benefit) we find a large and statistically significant 
effect of income transfers to parents that increases the probability of staying in education past 
the age of 16 when a relatively parsimonious model is used.  While the result is suggestive, 
we find that it becomes weaker when additional control variables are included in the model 
and a full evaluation of EMA’s would be required to provide the evidence on which to base 
policy. 
 
 93
References 
Acemoglu, Daron and Joshua Angrist (1999) “How Large are the Social Returns to 
Education? Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws” NBER working paper no. 
7444.  
Angrist, Joshua and Alan B. Krueger (1991), “Does Compulsory School Attendance Affect 
Schooling and Earnings”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106:979-1014. 
Angrist, Joshua and Alan B. Krueger (1992), “Estimating the Payoff to Schooling Using the 
Vietnam-Era Draft Lottery”, NBER Working Paper no. 4067. 
Angrist, Joshua and Victor Lavy (1997) “Using Maimonides’ Rules to Estimate the Effect of 
Class Size on Scholastic Achievement”, NBER Working Paper no. 5888. 
Angrist, Joshua and Witney Newey (1991),  “Over-Identification Tests in Earnings Functions 
with Fixed Effects.”, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics; 9(3), July: 317-23. 
Ashenfelter, Orley and Alan Kreuger (1994), “Estimates of the Economic Return to 
Schooling for a New Sample of Twins”, American Economic Review (84): 1157-73. 
Ashenfelter, Orley and Cecelia Rouse (1998), ”Income, Schooling, and Ability: Evidence 
from a New Sample of Identical Twins” , Quarterly Journal of Economics 113:253-
284. 
Ashenfelter Orley and David Zimmerman (1997), “ Estimates of the Return to Schooling 
from Sibling Data: Fathers, Sons and Brothers.” Review of Economics and Statistics 
79:1-9. 
Ashenfelter, O., Harmon, C. and Osterbeek, H. (1999) “Empirical Estimation of the 
School/Earnings Relationship-A Review”, Labor Economics 6(4), 453-70. 
Battu, H., C. R. Belfield and Peter J. Sloane (1999). “Overeducation Among Graduates: A 
Cohort View,” Education Economic 7, 1, 21-38. 
Barro, Robert and Lee, Jong-Wha (1993) “International Comparisons of Educational 
Attainment” Journal of Monetary Economics: 32(3) 363-94. 
Barro, Robert and Xavier Sala-I-Martin (1997), “Technological Diffusion, Convergence and 
Growth”, Journal of Economic Growth: 2(1), 1-26. 
Becker, Gary (1964), Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special 
Reference to Education, (Columbia University Press, New York). 
Benhabib, Jess and Mark Speigel (1994) “The Role of Human Capital in Economic 
Development: Evidence from Aggregate Cross Country Data” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 34(2) 143-73. 
Betts, Julian (1996), “Is There a Link Between School Inputs and Earnings?  Fresh Scrutiny 
of an Old Literature.”  In Burtless, Gary (ed).  Does Money Matter?  Washington: 
Brookings Institute. 
Blackburn, M. and David Neumark (1995), “Are OLS Estimates of the Return to Schooling 
Biased Downward?”  Review of Economics and Statistics, 77(2), May: 217-30. 
Blanchflower, David and Peter Elias (1999), “Ability, Schooling and Earning – Are Twins 
Different.”   Mimeo, Dartmouth College. 
 94
Blanchflower, David. and Andrew J. Oswald (1999). “Well-Being, Insecurity and the Decline 
of American Job Satisfaction,” mimeo, University of Warwick, UK. 
Blundell, R.W., Dearden, L., Goodman, A. and Reed, H. (1998) “Higher Education, 
Employment and Earnings in Britain”, Institute for Fiscal Studies Report. 
Bonjour, Dorothe; Jonathan Haskel and Denise Hawkes (2000), “Estimating Returns to 
Education Using a New Sample of Twins.”  Mimeo, Queen Mary and Westfield 
College. 
Bound, John, David Jaeger and Regina M. Baker (1995), “Problems with Instrumental 
Variables Estimation When the Correlation Between the Instruments and the 
Endogenous Explanatory Variables is Weak”, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 90: 443-450. 
Bound, John and David Jaeger (1996), “On the Validity of Season Of Birth as an Instrument 
in Wage Equations: A Comment on Angrist and Krueger’s ‘Does Compulsory School 
Attendance Affect Schooling and Earnings?’ NBER Working Paper no.5835. 
Bound, John and Gary Solon, (1998) “Double Trouble: On the Value of Twins-Based 
Estimation of the Return to Schooling” NBER working paper no.6721. 
Brown, D. and S. Mcintosh (1998). “If you’re Happy and You Know it…Job Satisfaction in 
the Low Wage Service Sector,” CEPR Working Paper, LSE. 
Brown, Sarah and John Sessions (1998) “Education, Employment Status and Earnings: A 
Comparative Test of the Strong Screening Hypothesis”, Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy 45(5):586-91. 
Butcher, Kristin and Anne Case (1994), “The Effect of Sibling Composition on Women’s 
Education and Earnings”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109:531-563. 
Cameron, Stephen and James Heckman (1998), “Life Cycle Schooling and Dynamic 
Selection Bias: Models and Evidence for Five Cohorts of American Males.”, Journal 
of Political Economy, 106(2), April: 262-333. 
Card, David (1995), “Earnings, Schooling, and Ability Revisited”, in Solomon Polacheck, 
editor, Research in Labor Economics Vol.14 (JAI Press, Greenwich Connecticut) 23-
48. 
Card, David (1999), “Education and Earnings”, in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, editors, 
Handbook of Labor Economics, (North Holland, Amsterdam and New York), 
forthcoming. 
Card, David and Alan Krueger (1996) “School Resources and Student Outcomes: An 
Overview of the Literature and New Evidence from North and South Carolina” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives: 10(4) 31-50. 
Card, David and Alan Krueger (1996) “Labor Market Effects of School Quality – Theory and 
Evidence.”  In Burtless, Gary (ed).  Does Money Matter?  Washington: Brookings 
Institute. 
Cawley, John; Karen Conneely; James Heckman and Edward Vytlacil (1996), “Measuring 
the Effects of Cognitive Ability”, NBER Working Paper Series no.5645. 
Cawley, John; James Heckman and Edward Vytlacil (1998), “Cognitive Ability and the 
Rising Return to Education”, NBER Working Paper Series no.6388. 
 95
Chevalier, Arnaud (2000).  “Graduate Overeducation in the UK.”   Mimeo, LSE Centre for 
the Economics of Education. 
Chevalier, Arnaud and Gauthier Lanot (2000), “Financial transfers and educational 
achievement”, Mimeo, University of Keele. 
Clark, A. E., and A. J. Oswald (1996). “Satisfaction and Comparison Income,” Journal of 
Public Economics 61, 359-381. 
Dearden, Lorraine (1995) “Education, Training and Earnings” phd Thesis, University College 
Dublin. 
Dearden, Lorraine (1998) “Ability, Families, Education and Earnings in Britain”, Institute for 
Fiscal Studies Working Paper no.W98/14. 
Dearden, Lorraine, Stephen Machin and Howard Reed (1997), “Intergenerational Mobility in 
Britain.”  Economic Journal;107(440), January: 47-66. 
Dearden, Lorraine, Steve McIntosh, Michal Myck and Anna Vignoles (2000).  “The Returns 
to Academic, Vocational and Basic Skills in Britain.”   DfEE/Skills Task Force 
Research Report 192.  
Denny, Kevin and Colm Harmon, (2000). “The Impact of Education and Training in the 
Labour Market Experiences of Young Adults”, IFS working paper no. W00/08. 
Denny, Kevin and Colm Harmon, (2000). “ Educational Policy Reform and the Return to 
Schooling from Instrumental Variables”, IFS working paper no. W00/06. 
Dolton, P. and Anna Vignoles (2000).   “The Incidence and Effects of Overeducation in the 
UK Graduate Labour Market.”   Economics of Education Review, 19, pp. 179-198. 
Duflo, Esther (1999) “Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of Scholl Construction in 
Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment”, mimeo, MIT. 
Dutta, J., Sefton, J. and Weale, M. (1999), Education and Public Policy, Fiscal Studies, 20, 
351-386. 
Evans, W. and Edward Montgomery (1994), “Education and Health: Where There's Smoke 
There's an Instrument.”  NBER Working Paper: 4949, December.  
Freeman, Richard B. (1986) “Demand for Education”, in Orley Ashenfelter and Richard 
Layard, editors, Handbook of Labor Economics, (North Holland, Amsterdam and 
New York).  
Griliches, Zvi (1977), “Estimating the Returns to Schooling: Some Econometric Problems.”  
 Econometrica, 45(1): 1-22. 
Griliches, Zvi (1979), “Sibling Models and Data in Economics : Beginnings of a Survey.”  
 Journal of Political Economy, 87: S37-S64. 
Groot, Wim. and Henriette M. Van Den Brink (1999). “Job Satisfaction and Preference 
Drift,” Economic Letters 63, 363-367. 
Groot, Wim and Henriette M. van den Brink (2000), “Overeducation in the Labor Market: A 
Meta Analysis”.  Economic of Education Review, 19 (2). 
Greenaway, David and Michelle Haynes, (2000) “Funding Universities to Meet National and 
International Challenges.”  Mimeo, University of Nottingham. 
Hamermesh Daniel and Jeff Biddle (1994), “Beauty and the Labour Market”, American 
Economic Review: Vol. 84, no. 5. 
 96
Hamermesh Daniel and Jeff Biddle (1998), “Beauty, Productivity and Discrimination: 
Lawyers’ Looks and Lucre” Journal of Labour Economics, 16(1) 172-201. 
Hanushek, Eric (1995), “Interpreting Recent Research on Schooling in Developing 
Countries.”  World Bank Research Observer, August 1995, 10: 227-246. 
Harmon, Colm and Hessel Oosterbeek (2000).  “Recent Development in the Empirical 
Analysis of Education Effects.”  Mimeo, University of Amsterdam. 
Harmon, Colm and Ian Walker (1995), “Estimates of the Economic Return to Schooling for 
the United Kingdom”, American Economic Review 85: 1278-1286. 
Harmon, Colm and Ian Walker (1999) “ The Marginal and Average Return to Schooling in 
the UK”, European Economic Review 43(4-6): 879-87. 
Harmon, Colm and Ian Walker, (2000) “Returns to the Quantity and Quality of Education: 
Evidence for Men in England and Wales.”  Economica 67: 19-35. 
Heckman, James (1990), “Varieties of Selection Bias.”  American Economic Review (Papers 
 and Proceedings) 80: 313-328. 
Heckman James and Soloman Polachek (1974), “ Empirical Evidence on the Functional 
Form of the Earnings-Schooling Relationship”, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 69: 350-354. 
Herrnstein, Richard and Charles Murray (1994),  The Bell Curve.   New York: Free Press. 
Hersch, J. (1991). “Education and Job Match,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 73, 1 
(February), 140-144. 
Hildreth, Andrew (1998) “Wages, Work and Unemployment” Applied Economics: 30(11) 
1351-47. 
Hildreth, Andrew (1997) “What has happened to the Union wage Differential in Britain in the 
1990s” The Institute for Labour Research, University of Essex discussion paper no. 
97/07. 
Hungerford, Thomas and Gary Solon (1987), “Sheepskin Effects in the Return to Education”, 
Review of Economics and Statistics 69: 175-177. 
Lang, K. (1993), “Ability Bias, Discount Rate Bias and the Return to Education.” Mimeo, 
Boston University. 
Ichino, Andrea and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer (2000), “The Long-Run Educational Cost of World 
War Two”.  Mimeo, EUI Florence. 
Isacsson, Gunnar (1999), “Estimates of the Return to Schooling in Sweden From a Large 
Sample Of Twins”, Labour Economics: 6(4) 471-489. 
Johnson, George E. and Frank Stafford (1973), “Social Returns to Quantity and Quality of 
Schooling.”  Journal of Human Resources, Spring, 8: 139-155. 
Kesselman, J. (1994).  “Public Policies to Combat Child Poverty: Goals and Options.”  
Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of British Columbia. 
Klein, R., Richard Spady and Andrew Weiss, (1991). “Factors Affecting the Quit 
Propensities of Production Workers,” Review of Economic Studies 58, 929-954. 
Kruger, Alan and Mickael Lindahl (1999) “Education for Growth in Sweden and the World” 
NBER working paper no. 7190. 
 97
Layard, Richard and George Psacharopoulos (1979) “Human Capital and Earnings: British 
Evidence and a Critique”, The Review of Economic Studies: Vol. 46, No. 3. 
Leigh, John (1998) “The Social Benefits of Education: A Review Article” Economics of 
Education Review: 17(3) 363-68. 
Levy-Garboua, L. and Montmarquette, C. (1997). “Reported Job Satisfaction: What Does it 
Mean?” C.R.D.E. Working Paper 0497, Universite de Montreal.  
Lochner, Lance (1999) “Education, Work and Crime: Theory and Evidence”, Rochester 
Center For Economic Research working paper no. 465. 
Mason, Geoff (1996) “Graduate Utilisation and the Quality of Higher Education in the UK” 
NIESR discussion paper no.158. 
Meghir, Costas and Martin Palme (1999) “Assessing the Effect of Schooling on Earnings 
using a social experiment”, IFS working paper no. W99/10. 
Micklewright, John, (1989), “Choice at Sixteen.”  Economica, February,  56: 25-39. 
Miller Paul, Charles Mulvey and Nick Martin (1995), “ What do Twins Studies Reveal about 
the Economic Return to Education? A Comparison of Australian and US Findings”, 
American Economic Review 85: 586-599. 
Mincer, Jacob (1974), Schooling, Experience and Earnings,(Columbia University Press, New 
York). 
Moretti, Enrico (1998) “Social Returns to Education and Human Capital Externalities; 
Evidence from Cities” Centre for Labour Research working paper no. 9, University of 
California, Berkeley  
Moretti, Enrico (1999) "Estimating the Social Return to Education: Evidence from Repeated 
Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Data," Centre for Labour Research working paper 
no. 2, University of California, Berkeley  
Murphy Kevin and Finis Welch (1990), “Empirical Age-Earnings Profiles”, Journal of Labor 
Economics 8:202-229. 
O’Neill, Donal (1995), “Education and Income Growth: Implications for cross-country 
inequality,” Journal of Political Economy, 103, no. 6, pp.1289-1301. 
O’Neill, Donal and Olive Sweetman (1998), “Intergenerational Mobility in Britain: Evidence 
from Unemployment Patterns.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 60 (4), 
November: 431-449. 
Park, Jin Heum (1996), “ Measuring Education Over Time”, Economics Letters 60: 425-428. 
Psacharopoulos, George (1994), “Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update”, 
World Development 22: 1325-1343. 
Raphael, Steven and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer (1999) “Identifying the Effect of Unemployment 
on Crime” CEPR working paper no. 2129. 
Rischall, Isaac (1999).  “The Roles of Education, Skill and Parental Income in Determining 
Wages.”   Mimeo, McMaster University. 
Rouse, Cecilia E. (1997), “Further Estimates of the Economic Return to Schooling from a 
New Sample of Twins”, Unpublished Discussion Paper, Princeton University 
Industrial Section.  
 98
 99
Sianesi, Barbara and John Van Reenen (1999).  “The Returns to Education – A Review of the 
Macroeconomic Literature.”   Mimeo, University College London. 
Spence, Michael (1973) “Job Market Signalling” Quarterly Journal Of Economics:87 (3) 
355-373. 
Stewart, Mark (1983) “On Least Squares Estimation When the Dependent Variable is 
Grouped.”  Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 50 (4), pp. 737-753. 
Topel, Robert H “Labor Markets and Economic Growth”, in Orley Ashenfelter and David 
Card, editors, Handbook of Labor Economics, (North Holland, Amsterdam and New 
York), forthcoming. 
Trostel, P.  (2000).   “Micro Evidence on Education as an Engine of Growth.”  Mimeo, 
 University of Warwick. 
Tsang, M. C., R. W. Rumberger and W. M. Levin (1991). “The Impact of Surplus Schooling 
on Work Productivity,” Industrial Relations 30, 209-228. 
Uusilato, Roope (1999) “Returns to Education in Finland” Labour Economics: 6(4) 569-80. 
Willis, Robert (1986), “Wage Determinants: A Survey and Reinterpretation of Human 
Capital Earnings Functions”, in Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard, editors, 
Handbook of Labor Economics, (North Holland, Amsterdam and New York). 
